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 This study looks at trends between data on military expenditures and conflict 
deaths to better understand how military and fiscal policy influences the outcomes of war. 
Although strong correlations between military expenditures and conflict deaths do not 
exist in most of the cases described in this study, years in which expenditures and deaths 
trend together often draw attention to significant events or policy changes that are ripe for 
qualitative analysis.  
 The primary methodology herein is to chart countries military spending and 
conflict deaths and to examine years, or periods of years, where military spending and 
conflict deaths either trended closely together or strongly diverged. Spending data 
throughout the study is in U.S. dollars. This data is also depicted at constant rates as 
noted to help readers better compare trends across years. Although this methodology does 
not control for the many intervening variables inherent in politics or conflict, it does 
reveal insights when applied across the range of cases observed in the following chapters.  
 Chapter two of this study specifically examines the U.S. program of Foreign 
Military Sales, in which the U.S. Government sells military technology, hardware, and 
training directly to foreign governments. These sales rarely proceeded increases in 
conflict deaths, suggesting that this program does not drive increased conflict violence 
and is thus a safe tool to employ over the short-term. Chapter three examines the military 
budgets of Colombia, Sri Lanka, Ethiopia, and Israel, and demonstrates significant 
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variance in military spending and conflict deaths between countries based on both a 
country’s overall level of expenditure and their primary security threat. Chapter three 
looks primarily at countries facing insurgencies and confirms the findings from chapter 
three by showing reliably negative correlations between high military spending and 
conflict deaths in countries with internal conflicts.  
 This study concludes that although strong correlations between military 
expenditures and conflict deaths are the exception, these cases should be examined to 
expand the understanding of conflict resolution and strengthen policymaking. 
Counterinsurgency efforts appear to benefit from high military spending when such 
funding is applied through local government channels and low military spending in 
poorer countries may be the product of necessity but interventions from allies may help 
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 At 2 trillion dollars, global military expenditures accounted for over two percent of 
the total wealth generated worldwide in 2019.1 With a budget of 686 billion dollars, the 
U.S. accounts for 36 percent of this total2 spending just over three percent of GDP on 
defense in 2019. Some countries with smaller budgets spend equally high amounts, such 
as Colombia, which also spent fully three percent of its GDP on defense in 2018.3 With 
spending at such a high level, understanding the consequences of these expenditures, 
positive or negative, should be of great interest to scholars and policymakers alike. If two 
or three percent of a country’s GDP is the cost of the safety and security of a nation and its 
people, this is likely money well spent. If this spending is drawing a country into conflict, 
causing the deaths of a nation’s citizens or those in neighboring countries or further afield, 
it should be viewed with skepticism.  
 
1 See: “Global Military Expenditure Sees Largest Annual Increase  - Says SIPRI – reaching $1917 billion 
in 2019,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 27 April 2020, 
https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2020/global-military-expenditure-sees-largest-annual-increase-
decade-says-sipri-reaching-1917-billion. And: “GDP (Current US$),” The World Bank, 2020, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD. 
2 “FY 2019 Defense Budget,” U.S. Department of Defense, February 2018, 
https://dod.defense.gov/News/SpecialReports/Budget2019.aspx. 
3 Calculated based on World Bank GDP data and military spending figures from SIPRI. See note 1.  
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 Scholars have examined how military spending has affected conflict outcomes,4 
and how it is used to procure and equip soldiers with new technologies.5 With such vast 
wealth at the disposal of military leaders and a vast array of tasks to spend it on, from 
research and development, to training, to supplying troops on the battlefield, there are many 
ways to account for and quantify military expenditures. One of the most fundamentally 
unique elements of military activity, however, is the military’s state sanctioned ability to 
kill. With the exception of some recent studies,6 the relationship between military spending 
and military killing has largely avoided systematic scrutiny. This study begins to apply 
some scrutiny by examining the relationship between military expenditure and conflict 
deaths.  
 Scholars have been concerned with military use of force, perhaps never more so 
than during the Cold War, when they had to grapple with the new reality of nuclear 
weapons and were thus faced with the existential concern of human annihilation resting 
under the control of just a few powerful men. The rise of nuclear arsenals also coincided 
with an increase in military spending, which became a topic of additional concern among 
theorists of military strategy.7 In the nuclear context, however, there is little point in 
quantifying the killing potential for which a country may have paid, in light of the reality 
 
4 Errol A. Henderson and Reşat Bayer, “Wallets, Ballots, or Bullets: Does Wealth, Democracy, or Military 
Capabilities Determine War Outcomes?” International Studies Quarterly 57, no. 2 (June 2013): 303–17. 
doi:10.1111/isqu.12026. 
5 Warren Chin, “Technology, War and the State: Past, Present and Future,” International Affairs 95, no. 4 
(July 2019): 767. doi:10.1093/ia/iiz106. 
6 Carrie A. Lee, and John Kendall, “Use It or Lose It: The Political Economy of Counterinsurgency 
Strategy,” Armed Forces & Society 45, no. 3 (July 2019): 399–429. doi:10.1177/0095327X18790570. 
7 See note 5: p. 770.  
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that even by the 1950s, the U.S. and Russia could both likely kill every person on Earth 
many times over.8  
President Ronald Reagan’s (R) concept of “peace through strength” was the U.S.’s 
answer to this existential problem. It established a defensive military regime based on the 
high levels of military spending required to develop the needed “strength” in this new 
world of nuclear weapons, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and missile defense systems.  
His White House biography links this concept to a 35 percent increase in military spending 
during his presidency.9 The premise behind this concept, built upon the neorealist political 
theories of Kenneth Waltz and others, is that by building up insurmountable military force, 
a country can protect itself against attack.10 Naturally, adherents to this philosophy 
advocate for high levels of military spending to build up the forces viewed as necessary to 
create strength and the resultant peace they believe will follow. This view has persisted in 
U.S. foreign policy with the current administration’s 2018 budget proposal citing “peace 
through strength” in conjunction with a 65 billion dollar requested increase in military 
spending.11 
President Reagan’s foreign policy is not without critics who view the increased 
military spending called for by peace through strength adherents as a false premise. Scholar 
Andrew Bacevich describes Reagan’s 1983 assurances that the United States was 
 
8 Max Roser and Mohamed Nagdy, “Nuclear Weapons,” OurWorldInData.org. (2013). 
https://ourworldindata.org/nuclear-weapons'. From: Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Nuclear 
Weapons Inventory by Country,” Federation of American Scientists. http://thebulletin.org/nuclear-
notebook-multimedia.  
9 Frank Freidel and Hugh Sidey, “Ronald Reagan,” (The White House, 2006) 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-white-house/presidents/ronald-reagan/. 
10 Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory." The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 
18, no. 4 (1988): 616. doi:10.2307/204817. 
11 Office of Management and Budget, “America First: A Budget Blueprint to Make America Great Again,” 
(March 16, 2017): 15. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/2018_blueprint.pdf. 
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inherently peaceful as “at least 50 percent bunkum,” writing that “American military 
tradition has never viewed defense as anything other than a pause before seizing the 
initiative and taking the fight to the enemy.”12 In the strategic context of the Cold War, 
however, the conflicts that did occur were not nuclear but conventional and often fought 
between proxies.   
 In fact, violent conflict among major powers ceased in the form it was known prior 
to 1945 and the modern era has seen a series of proxy conflicts play out between global 
powers from Latin America to Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Despite the great 
existential worries of Cold War scholars, their worst fears have not been realized. Cold 
War concepts of defense and international security have altered the new conflict 
environment, however. The paradigm of high military spending has set the stage for 
numerous modern conflicts and in many cases contributed to their development by 
supplying arms or allowing militarized actors to get involved. The question is, to what end?  
 Thinking outside the Cold War concepts of defense strategy, which have 
diminished,13 particularly in the post 9/11 context, questions relating to military spending 
and conflict can be grounded in observations and data rather than philosophy and 
hypotheticals. Globally, military budgets and the associated “strength” they bring have 
soared while conflict deaths have trended downwards. Despite this broad finding, it may 
seem logically obvious that the development and distribution of increasingly efficient and 
deadly weapons of war could only lead to an increase in death and misery. In the complex 
geopolitical world in which conflicts exist, this does not appear to be the case.  
 
12 Andrew J. Bacevich, Twilight of the American Century. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
2018): 310. 
13 William J. Crowe Jr., and Alan D. Romberg. “Rethinking Security in the Pacific.” Foreign Affairs 70, no. 
2 (Spring 1991): 123–40. doi:10.2307/20044713. 
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One can argue that proliferating conventional weapons creates a deterrent effect 
just as Cold War theorists proposed. Countries with evenly matched arsenals would be left 
afraid to challenge each other and outmatched armies could be forced to capitulate thereby 
avoiding potential conflict. Similarly, efficient arsenals may lead to quick victories 
ultimately saving much time, suffering, and many resources in the process. Military 
spending can also buy more than weapons. Improved training may increase troops’ lethality 
or help them practice restraint. Likewise, improved battlefield medicine and faster medical 
evacuations on planes, helicopters and ground transports could reduce battlefield deaths as 
argued by Tanisha Fazal in her recent article “War is Not Over.”14 There is undoubtedly a 
complex web of interconnected factors at play in this discussion.  
 It is possible that all of the hypotheticals above may apply to specific conflicts, but 
proving that to be true would explain nothing more than that conflicts exist in a complex 
political landscape. Despite the challenges inherent in understanding these complexities, it 
is still important to understand the role military expenditure plays in numerous conflicts 
around the globe. As a result, to build a foundation from which to better understand the 
role of military spending, specific and easily quantifiable variables need to be selected and 
examined.  
 The following chapters focus on examining the relationship between military 
expenditures and conflict deaths. Deaths related to conflict are uniquely linked to military 
expenditure as a function of a country’s policy decisions and are also among the most 
specific quantifiable outcomes of conflict. Examining conflict deaths and military spending 
and comparing trends between them cannot explain the complexities of any individual 
 
14 Tanisha M. Fazal and Paul Poast, “War is Not Over: What the Optimists Get Wrong About Conflict,” 
Foreign Affairs (2019). https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-10-15/war-not-over. 
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conflict, and these variables do not account for externalities like funding from third parties, 
secret government spending, criminal contributions to conflict, or the how spending may 
translate deaths into injuries. They can, however, provide a unique lens through which to 
discuss a conflict, a country’s fiscal and military policy, and global trends in military 
operations and their funding. Although this study does not intend to argue that there is a 
causative link between military expenditures and conflict deaths, or vice versa, it is 
assumed that in cases where military spending and conflict deaths both trend strongly 
together this is unlikely pure coincidence and is likely to highlight significant events, 
changes in policy, or military strategy that merit examination. Similarly, unusual trends in 
this data with little plausible explanation in the findings below may suggest interesting 
cases for additional research. From the broadest perspective, this study hopes to inform the 
discussion around military policy by framing a fundamental outcome of military spending 
in terms of its impact on the loss of human lives.  
 The methodology in the chapters below is simple. Charts show military spending 
for a given country and conflict deaths in that country or region over a period of years. 
Generally, this data covers the thirty-year period from 1988 to 2018 due to the consistent 
availability of data during that time. In cases where data is available only for shorter 
periods, charts have been adjusted accordingly. Military spending data is represented in 
USD at constant rates in most cases to help readers make comparisons across years. Where 
correlations exist across the entire date range of a chart, they are discussed in hopes of 
better understanding the significance of such correlations, if any, to the country in question, 
the conflict or conflicts in which that county is involved, and military spending generally. 
In cases where statistical correlation does not exist or is weak, individual trends are 
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examined on an annual basis. There are slight variations in this methodology in each 
chapter and these variations are described in the chapter where they are relevant.  
 The analysis of this data rests on several assumptions. First, is that an increase in 
military expenditure increases a country’s military capability. A budget increase that only 
covered a country’s increased pension expenses, for example, would not increase capacity 
in a meaningful way over the short-term. This study assumes, however, that military budget 
increases are generally applied across a range of priorities and would include proportional 
increases to in areas such as procurements or training. This study also assumes that military 
spending is driven by a country’s national security priorities and not by unrelated business, 
political, or corruption-driven motives that may otherwise impact spending trends. One 
advantage to looking at macro spending trends, as this study does, is that even in cases 
where these other factors may be present the opportunity for such factors to impact a 
country’s entire budget is limited. Nuanced country specific study would be required, 
however, to completely account for the possibility of some interference in this regard.  
 There are a variety of patterns in the data for the case studies in the following 
chapters. Some countries with relatively high levels of military spending, like Taiwan, exist 
in regions that are quite peaceful. Though geopolitical tension may be high, their spending 
does not appear to cause any deaths. Other high spending countries like the U.S. or Saudi 
Arabia are likely responsible for many deaths. Similar discrepancies exist between low 
spending countries. Despite these variances, patterns do emerge between countries, conflict 
types, and spending levels that can all be analyzed in the hopes of informing policy and 




 The broadest finding across the chapters below is that there is little apparent 
correlation between military expenditure and conflict deaths and increased levels of 
spending have coincided with relatively low worldwide levels of conflict deaths. There are, 
however, numerous exceptions that can be found within individual countries, conflict 
types, and at various levels of relative spending. Chapter two discusses the delivery of 
weapons to countries through the U.S. Foreign Military Sales program. These deliveries 
often lag conflict occurring near the end of a conflict, or even after a conflict ends, thereby 
appearing as an unlikely driver of conflict deaths in the short term. Chapter three looks at 
the overall military budgets of Israel, Ethiopia, Colombia, and Sri Lanka. These cases 
indicate that relationships between military expenditure and conflict deaths are more easily 
observed in countries with lower overall military spending. This suggests that high levels 
of spending may mask trends otherwise visible and may allow high spending countries to 
engage in conflict without changing their budget priorities or otherwise boost funding for 
their forces.  
Chapters three and four also both suggest that more reliable negative correlations 
between military spending and conflict deaths exist when militaries are engaged in internal 
conflict. As a result, it appears that countries have increased influence on military 
operations that occur within their borders and that military spending is a uniquely 
significant factor in counterinsurgency operations which have been a fixture since the Cold 
War proxy conflict era. This study also contributes to a broader discussion of economic 
inequality by highlighting several case studies that demonstrate how countries with the 
highest levels of military expenditure often bear the lowest burden from the impact of 
















Is the United States a “merchant of death,” as certain scholars and members of the 
media15 would portray it? The U.S. is undoubtedly a top exporter of military hardware and 
training as evidenced by the volume of Foreign Military Sales (FMS), which topped 51 
billion dollars in agreements and 27 billion dollars in deliveries in fiscal year 2017 alone.16 
The U.S. government’s justification behind the FMS program is to “sell defense articles 
and services to foreign countries and international organizations when the President 
formally finds that to do so will strengthen the security of the U.S. and promote world 
peace.”17 So do these sales promote peace or do weapons equate to death as some pundits 
believe? What is the connection between FMS and conflict, do higher sales result in greater 
body counts? And if not, are there regional discrepancies that merit further exploration? 
This chapter seeks to begin answering these questions, particularly in light of the little 
research that has been done in this area. 
 
15 Robert F. Drinan, “Why Is the United States the World’s Merchant of Death?” America 171, no. 8 
(September 24, 1994): 4–5. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=asn&AN=9410112491&site=ehost-
live&scope=site. 
16 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and 
Other Security Cooperation Historical Facts as of September 30, 2017,” Fiscal Year Series (September 30, 
2017): 2. https://www.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/fiscal_year_series_-_30_september_2017.pdf.  




This chapter tracks trends between FMS deliveries and conflict deaths between 
1989 and 2017 and seeks explanations for years in which there are significant correlations 
between the two. Beginning with the look at global FMS deliveries and global conflict 
deaths, it is apparent that while FMS deliveries have grown substantially, conflict deaths 
worldwide have generally trended down. This does little to explain the relationship 
between the arms trade and conflict related deaths, however, and a closer look at the data 
suggests that there are isolated instances, usually over a period of one to three years, where 
FMS deliveries and conflict deaths trend upwards together. Examining world events in this 
context begins to reveal a pattern suggesting that FMS deliveries trail conflict rather than 
precede it. 
After a discussion of terms, explanation of methodology, and brief review of 
relevant literature, this chapter is divided into three sections examining FMS delivery data 
for Saudi Arabia, Ukraine, and Taiwan, respectively. In each case, links between FMS 
deliveries and conflict deaths in that country’s region are explored. In both the Saudi and 
Ukrainian cases, instances are uncovered which match the trend observed in the worldwide 
data. Where FMS deliveries and conflict deaths sharply trend upwards, deliveries often 
trail deaths. Taiwan offers a unique perspective as a country with high levels of spending 
within the FMS framework in a region that has had extremely low conflict deaths over the 
past 30 years. Taken together, this seems to suggest that weapons sales, and FMS deliveries 
in particular, serve to contain or prevent conflict.  
Note on the Data 
This chapter’s focus is on FMS deliverables. In the context of FMS, deliverables 
on an annual basis are the actual weapons or military aid delivered to a country in a given 
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year. Deliveries contrast with agreements, which may be signed in a given year but not 
delivered until years later. Data for deliveries is taken directly from the U.S. Defense 
Security Cooperation Agency website.18 FMS likely looks different within each country 
that receives it from the U.S. Some countries may buy weapons directly from the U.S. 
government, bundling them with U.S. contracts from their suppliers. In other cases, the 
U.S. may be providing training with little or no weapons or related systems included as 
part of the contract. In either case, the underlying goal is similar. The U.S. is attempting to 
bolster the militaries of foreign governments, making them more lethal in the process, 
either by providing weapons or training forces to use weapons or related military 
technologies.  
The relationship to be explored is between FMS, described above, and conflict. In 
this context, conflict is defined as the number of deaths in a given region each year as the 
result of both inter and intrastate war. This data is pulled from two data sets to obtain the 
most accurate picture possible: Regional battle death data is from the University of 
Uppsala’s Uppsala Conflict Data Program,19 while the global conflict death data is pulled 
from The World Bank “Battle Related-Deaths”20 dataset. The University of Uppsala data 
has been specifically selected for the ability to cross reference deaths by both country and 
year. As a result, FMS will be analyzed as it relates to the number of deaths across all 
conflicts in a region each year. 
 
18 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Foreign Military Sales,” (2017)..  
19 Bethany Lacina & Nils Petter Gleditsch, 2005. 'Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of 
Battle Deaths', European Journal of Population 21(2–3): 145–166 




Although correlation does not equate to causation, attempts will be made explain 
any correlation or inverse correlation observed, especially in cases where the relationship 
appears particularly strong. Given this study’s simple methodology, correlations between 
FMS and conflict deaths are used to facilitate qualitative discussion regarding these trends 
and their policy implications rather than to prove a mathematical calculation to peg conflict 
deaths to FMS expenditure or vice versa. The following aims to provide a broad look into 
this topic and provide a starting point for future research.  
Case Study Selection 
 This paper intends to focus on three specific cases to assess the impact of FMS on 
conflict. The three cases that have been selected are Saudi Arabia, Ukraine, and Taiwan. 
All three have been selected for their relevance to U.S. policy and each country selected 
has an opportunity to function as a proxy for the U.S. in countering a regional adversary: 
Saudi Arabia can serve as a counter to Iran, Ukraine to Russia, and Taiwan to China. Due 
to these regional relationships, all three countries have reason to receive FMS along with 
other types of U.S. military assistance including DCS. Additionally, all three countries are 
in distinct and disparate regions of the world, thereby allowing for a more complete 
assessment of the impact of FMS deliveries on regional conflict. The ultimate goal in 
looking at each of these cases studies, in addition to looking at the connection between 
FMS and conflict, is to assess the effectiveness of FMS as policy tool which, like conflict, 






Causes of Conflict 
 All three of the selected case studies must be considered in light of the larger 
context of peace and conflict studies. Scholars developed the peace and conflict studies 
discipline largely in the wake of the Second World War, with the goal of preventing future 
conflict through a better understanding of its causes.21 There was an urgency brought to 
the arms control debate by the advent of nuclear weapons which persisted throughout the 
1960s, 70s, and 80s in the context of the Cold War. Although concerns over the causes of 
conflict and how to stop it link back to philosophers such as Hugo Grotius and Thomas 
Hobbes, as Shaheen Showkat Dar describes in his 2017 review of Peace and Conflict 
Studies literature, “the significance of peace and conflict studies appeared to be in decline” 
after the fall of the Soviet Union.22 Nuclear deterrence theorists primarily concern 
themselves with how to avert a nuclear exchange between the U.S. and Soviet Union and 
devote significant efforts to strategizing ways to reduce nuclear stockpiles and control 
proliferation.23  
As a signatory of the “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” the 
U.S. does not export nuclear weapons within the FMS or any other military sales 
program.24 Despite this, nuclear theorists share arms control concerns with those who look 
at conventional arms. Underlying these concerns is the idea that these weapons could lead 
 
21 Shaheen Showkat Dar, “Disciplinary Evolution of Peace and Conflict Studies: An Overview,” 




23 Tatiana Anichkina Anna Péczeli, and Nickolas Roth, “The Future of US–Russian Nuclear Deterrence and 
Arms Control,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 73, no. 4 (July 2017): 271. 
doi:10.1080/00963402.2017.1338046. 
24 United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” 
(July 1, 1968) https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/.  
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to an increase in conflict and death. Although the potential is certainly there, nuclear 
weapons have not caused any deaths since World War Two.  
Nuclear Deterrence scholars’ concerns are often existential. They worry less about 
whether weapons are likely to cause or avert conflict over the short term, and more about 
these conflicts’ potential to culminate in a devastating nuclear exchange. Articles such as 
Tatiana Anichkina’s “The Future of US–Russian Nuclear Deterrence and Arms Control”25 
and Ariel Bachar’s “Jcpoa: Implications and Effects on Our Foreign Military Sales 
Program” criticize the export of both nuclear and conventional arms. Bachar specifically 
criticizes FMS in light of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and includes 
recommendations to strengthen the AECA that would apply to both FMS and conventional 
weapons sales. Both authors recommend the curtailment of programs like FMS. Their 
argument to limit arms exports is based upon the high-risk nature of nuclear weapons, 
however, rather than a nuanced look at the impacts of conventional weapons proliferation.   
 The Cold War trend of increasing global trade in conventional arms has persisted 
and locks the U.S. and Russia into ever increasing sales.26 Criticism of these sales often 
focuses on the potential effects of the expansive sale and distribution of weapons. Critics 
operate under the assumption that weapons are a natural catalyst for violence, but this 
assertion has been little tested.  One study, which discusses the link between U.S. weapons 
 
25 See note 23. 
26 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “Global Share of Major Arms Exports by the 10 





sales and political violence, found “the availability of weapons is rarely discussed as a 
plausible determinant of war.”27 
In his introduction to the 1992 Arms Control and Confidence Building in the Middle 
East, editor Alan Platt writes, “no causal relationship between inventories of arms and the 
likelihood of war exists.”28 Although Platt does little to explain this statement, if true, it 
would lay to rest concerns that arms sales and the resultant increase in weapons would lead 
to an increase in conflict. Strangely, Platt goes on to define arms control as “‘any measure 
that reduces the likelihood of war as an instrument of policy or that limits the 
destructiveness and duration of war should it break out.’”29 This is a broad definition of 
arms control that seems to contain a tacit acknowledgement that a lack of arms control, 
which would presumably lead to more weapons in the region, is likely to increase the 
likelihood of war, and its destructiveness, should war occur. This seems to be at odds with 
his earlier statement that no causal relationship exists between arms and war. Platt’s 
argument illuminates a philosophical paradox inherent in the foundation of the arms control 
debate. To what extent can arms be separated from armed conflict? If combatants forced 
to give up their arms will simply pick up rocks and continue to fight, arms may be tangential 
to conflict. If this were truly the case, however, the upwards spiral of weapons development 
and proliferation seen during the cold would seem an unlikely political reality.  
Scholarship is split between the positions that complicate Platt’s introduction 
above. Former Israeli Defense Forces Chief of Staff, Mordechai Gur summarizes a typical 
 
27 Arvind Magesan and Eik Leong Swee, “Out of the Ashes, Into the Fire: The consequences of U.S. 
weapons sales for political violence” European Economic Review 107 (August 2018): 135. doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.05.003. 
28 Alan Platt, Arms Control and Confidence Building in the Middle East, (Washington: United States 




deterrence argument by arguing that “a balance of military terror or fear”30 is needed to 
promote peace. This rationale can be used to argue both for arms control (reduction) or 
additional procurement and sales. In either case, the premise is that maintaining a balance 
between adversaries reduces their incentives to engage in conflict.  
Sylvain Chassange and Gerard Padro i Miquel build on this concept in their article, 
“Conflict and Deterrence under Strategic Risk.” They conclude that in an uncertain 
strategic environment, increased weapons stockpiles can have a destabilizing effect but 
they also argue that an imbalance between adversaries’ relative military strength can be a 
boon for peace as long as the weaker power maintains “sufficient weapon stocks to 
dissuade the stronger party from unilateral attacks.”31 This is consistent with the 1980 
scholarship of Richard K. Betts who challenged arms control wisdom of the day and 
ultimately concluded that arms sales should be considered on a case by case basis and with 
due consideration of a multitude of factors rather than supported or condemned outright.32 
A similarly neutral view on arms sales is expressed by Andrew J. Pierre in his 2014 The 
Global Politics of Arms Sales.33  
 These ideas have been adopted by theorists of peacekeeping operations as well. The 
2019 article “Assessment of Peace Operations” describes the “short term missions” of 
peace operations, including, “disarmament…. Measured by among other things the volume 
 
30 Mordechai Gur, “Destabilizing Elements of the Middle East Military Balance” in Arms Control in the 
Middle East, Dore Gold, ed. (Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Post, 1990): 9.  
31 Sylvain Chassang and Gerard Padro i Miquel, “Conflict and Deterrence under Strategic Risk,” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 125, no. 4 (November 2010): 1846. doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2010.125.4.1821. 
32 Richard K. Betts, "The Tragicomedy of Arms Trade Control," International Security 5, no. 1 (1980): 
109-110. https://www.muse.jhu.edu/article/446485. 
33 Andrew J. Pierre, The Global Politics of Arms Sales, Course Book ed., Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2014. muse.jhu.edu/book/33580.  
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of weapons collected.”34 This suggests a link to the position established by Platt in 
attributing some increased risk of conflict to weapon stockpiles without explicitly declaring 
weapons as a causative factor.  
Other scholars have staked out unequivocal positions on arms sales. These scholars 
tend to be contemporary, narrowly focused, and their findings suggest a link between arms 
sales, conflict, and violence of various types. The 2015 “Bases, Bullets, and Ballots” 
focused specifically on paramilitary violence within Colombia and was able to demonstrate 
a link between U.S. military aid and violence within the country.35 A related finding is 
presented in the 2018 “Out of the Ashes, Into the Fire”36 which looks at Direct Commercial 
Sales (DCS) of U.S. military technology. The authors conclude that although DCS reduces 
internal repression in receiving countries, it increases the likelihood of civil war, thereby 
clearly demonstrating a link between DCS and conflict. These articles are not completely 
without historical precedent, however, as evidenced by Susan G. Sample’s 1997 article 
linking arms races to conflict. Sample builds her argument on research from 1979.37 Jean 
Klein’s 1983 article “Arms Sales, Development, Disarmament” also argues for a reduction 
in arms sales from the U.S. and Soviet Union, both of which Klein blames for stoking 
conflict “on the outskirts of the industrialized world.”38 
 
34 Paul F. Diehl and Daniel Druckman, “Assessment of Peace Operations,” in The Palgrave Encyclopedia 
of Peace and Conflict Studies, eds. Oliver Richmond and Gëzim Visoka, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019). 
https://doi-org.proxy1.library.jhu.edu/10.1007/978-3-030-11795-5. 
35 Oeindrila Dube and Suresh Naidu, “Bases, Bullets, and Ballots: The Effect of US Military Aid on 
Political Conflict in Colombia,” Journal of Politics 77, no. 1 (January 2015): 249–67. doi:10.1086/679021. 
36 Magesan, 133-156. 
37 Susan G. Sample, "Arms Races and Dispute Escalation: Resolving the Debate," Journal of Peace 
Research 34, no. 1 (1997): 7-22. Accessed March 11, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/424827. 
38 Jean Klein, "Arms Sales, Development, Disarmament," Bulletin of Peace Proposals 14, no. 2 (1983): 
157. Accessed February 12, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/44480999. 
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So, what is the cause of conflict? Is it purely a matter of nature as Thomas Hobbes 
wrote in 1651, “the condition of Man, is a condition of Warre”?39 The verdict, it seems, is 
still out over 370 years later. Scholars often discuss arms control within the larger debates 
concerning the avoidance of conflict, but few attempt to link arms and conflict together as 
related variables. Nuclear deterrence theorists avoid claims regarding weapons as causative 
factors for conflict violence but advocate for their reduction or elimination due to the high 
risk their use poses. Scholars like Platt and Betts discuss the risks of conventional 
armaments but similarly refrain from describing weapons as causative variables for 
assessing conflict.  
Recent scholarship has re-engaged with a neglected thread of argument from the 
1970s and 80s in order to bend the conversation around weapons, and the related trade, in 
a direction that links them much more closely to conflict. The debate is sure to be ongoing, 
assuming the worst fears of nuclear deterrence theorists fail to be realized. Despite certain 
theorists discounting of arms as a direct cause of conflict, understanding how these 
variables interact is a key issue within the peace and conflict studies discipline and one that 
deserves continued attention.  
Global Data and Related Cases 
Global data on conflict tells a nuanced tale. Figure 2.1 shows that worldwide 
deaths from armed conflict only weakly correlate with changes in FMS.40 
 
39 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Auckland: The Floating Press, 2009), 232.  
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While this may not be the case regionally, it does immediately call into question any 
argument that links weapon sales to increases in deaths. From 2003 until 2009, FMS 
deliveries slowly climbed from 10 billion dollars per year to 16 billion dollars even as 
deaths varied between 20,000 and 40,000 per year, relative lows for the period of analysis. 
A spike in deaths between 2011 and 2014, which can be largely attributed to the war in 
Syria, coincided with only modest increases in FMS deliveries that appear well within 
annual norms. It could be argued that a glut of weapons accumulated over the preceding 
years contributed to the conflict deaths between 2011 and 2014, but as is shown in the 
following case studies, this does not match the buying patterns of individual countries. 
Even as sales spiked to unprecedented levels in 2017, conflict deaths dropped to levels not 
seen for almost two decades. Even though no overarching pattern emerges during this 28 
year look at global FMS deliveries and conflict deaths, there are some observations that 



































 The first correlation apparent in Figure 2.1 occurs around 1999. It must be noted 
that there is a significant spike in FMS deliveries between 1997 and 1999. In 1999 and 
2000, a dramatic increase in deaths can also be noted. The most significant number of 
conflict deaths worldwide during this period was the result of the Eritrean-Ethiopian War 
(1999-2000), which accounts for over half of the worldwide conflict deaths during this 
period.41 This period also saw significant conflict deaths with the outbreak of the Second 
Chechen War and war between India and Pakistan.  
 In all three cases, anomalous FMS delivery patterns can be observed. Eritrea 
received its largest ever delivery, amounting to about 1.4 million dollars, in 1997.42 
Ethiopia also received an unusually large delivery in 2000, as part of an agreement that 
appears to have been signed in 1998.43 It is possible these increases in FMS deliveries were 
the result of Eritrea anticipating hostilities and Ethiopia hoping to gain the edge in an 
ongoing conflict. 
In the case of the Chechen War, neighboring Georgia received its first ever delivery 
of FMS in 1999 and a significant increase in 2000.44 Georgia’s first FMS agreement with 
the U.S. had been inked just the year prior. Again, while this may pure coincidence, it is 
also possible that concerns over the nearby conflict between Russia and Chechen rebels 
encouraged the newly independent Georgia to take proactive measures to arm itself.  
 
41 Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand 
(2002) Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset. Journal of Peace Research 39(5). And Therese 
Pettersson et al., “Organized violence, 1989-2018 and peace agreements,” Journal of Peace Research 
56(4). 
42 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and 
Other Security Cooperation Historical Facts as of September 30, 2017,” 835. 
43 Ibid, 840.  
44 Ibid, 491. 
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 The conflict between India and Pakistan in 1999 bucks the trend set by the two 
examples above, but only because of the very specific political considerations in the region. 
Both India and Pakistan had received some amount of FMS from the U.S. in the years 
leading up to 1999. India, however, tested a nuclear device in 1998,45 and subsequently 
suffered a complete blackout of FMS from 1999 until 2001, with FMS resuming in 2002.46 
Pakistan suffered a similar years-long blackout of FMS during the war with military 
cooperation having been halted by the U.S. in 1990, because of the Pakistani nuclear 
program.47  
The India-Pakistan case highlights the political nature of FMS, as both countries 
found themselves cut off from the U.S. weapons. Certainly, both countries looked 
elsewhere for weapons during this conflict. Imports from Russia would be a likely source 
of supply along with local production.  In 1998, despite mild criticism of India’s Pokhran 
II nuclear test, Russia signaled a desire for increased cooperation with India on both 
commercial nuclear energy and military technology.48 It is unclear what impact, if any, the 
lack of U.S. weapons had on this conflict. Both countries likely had remaining supplies 
from previous agreements, and despite the lack of FMS throughout, casualties were still 
high compared the rest of world during those years.  
 A similar but more modest bump in both FMS deliveries and conflict deaths can be 
observed in 2009. Once again, the data shows several hotspots for conflict deaths in 2009. 
In this case, the two hotspots are the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Sri 
 
45 K. Alan Kronstadt and Shayerah I. Akhtar, “India-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress,” (Washington: 
Congressional Research Service, 2017): 15. 
46 Defense Security Cooperation Agency (2017): 265-266.  
47 Richard F. Grimmett, “U.S. Arms Sales to Pakistan,” (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 
2009): 1-2.  
48 Petr V. Topychkanov, “US-Soviet/Russian Dialogue on the Nuclear Weapons Programme of India,” 
Strategic Analysis 42 no. 3 (2018): 254.  
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Lanka, which was in the final stage of a civil war against Tamil rebels. Unfortunately, the 
high number of deaths in Afghanistan observed in 2009, was not an anomaly in that region 
at the time. Interestingly, the country hit a seven-year low in FMS deliveries that year and 
received deliveries valued at only 1.8 million dollars.49 This negative correlation between 
Afghani military spending and conflict deaths will be discussed in detail in chapter four.  
Pakistan saw a surge in FMS deliveries the year after Afghanistan’s surge of 
violence in the 2010. Many of Pakistan’s 2010 deliveries appear to have been inked in 
2006.50 This suggests that although the deliveries may have been related to the ongoing 
war against the Taliban, it is unlikely they were specifically influenced by any activity in 
2009.  
 Sri Lanka is more instructive example because of the isolated nature of the conflict 
against the Tamils. An extreme surge in violence occurs in 2009 followed by a spike in 
spending in 2010 while the country’s death toll drops to zero. Unlike Afghanistan, which 
had high levels of conflict deaths for years, Sri Lanka had just over 2,000 deaths associated 
with their civil war in 2006,  
 
49 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and 
Other Security Cooperation Historical Facts as of September 30, 2017,” 234. 
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followed by a massive surge, visible in Figure 2.2. In 2008, as the government made a push 
to end the war, deaths spiked. With the war over, no deaths were reported in 2010.51 Sri 
Lanka had only once received over 1 million dollars in FMS deliveries until receiving over 
6 million dollars’ worth of deliveries in 2010. Most the agreements for these deliveries 
were signed in 2003 and 2004,52 shortly after the Tamil rebels called off peace talks.53 As 
a result, it seems likely that Sri Lanka did attempt boost their arsenal when their civil war 
appeared likely to continue but received the weapons after the conflict ended.  
 It is clear from these examples that the data does not show a general correlation 
between FMS deliveries and conflict deaths. With countries like Eritrea and Ethiopia, 
where FMS agreements and deliveries occurred within a short time frame and in the context 
 
51 Bethany Lacina & Nils Petter Gleditsch, “Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle 
Deaths,” European Journal of Population 21 no. 2-3 (2005): 145–166. 
52 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and 
Other Security Cooperation Historical Facts as of September 30, 2017,” 354. 
































Figure 2.2: Sri Lanka FMS Deliveries and 





of a violent war, FMS and conflict deaths can be anecdotally linked. Similarly, surges in 
arming can be seen in countries with close proximity to conflict such as with Georgia and 
Pakistan. The Sri Lankan case shows that while countries may increase their arms 
purchases due to conflict, they are often capable of waging bloody wars without a massive 
infusion of U.S. weapons.  
With the exception of the India-Pakistan case, every country mentioned above saw 
unusually high numbers of FMS deliveries either before or after years in which high 
number of conflict deaths occurred in their region. Although the data does not seem to 
suggest U.S. weapons were responsible for increases in deaths, countries clearly go 
shopping for weapons when death is near. These purchases may be made in preparation for 
military campaigns, to deter conflict or prevent it from spilling in from neighboring 
countries, or even in an attempt to end conflict or restock after a war ends.   
Saudi Arabia 
 FMS to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia makes sense in light of the contentious 
relationship between the U.S. and Iran.54 Iran stands as the primary state adversary of the 
U.S. in a region where the U.S. has significant interest in oil exports. Saudi Arabia is a key 
ally in countering Iranian influence in proxy wars in Syria and Yemen, although allegations 
of human rights abuses call into question the validity of supporting Saudi Arabia with 
weapons.55  Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia has been a significant recipient of FMS, with  
several instances where it received more than 1 billion dollars in U.S. arms in a year. For 
example, in 2017 the Kingdom received over 5 billion dollars in FMS which represents 
 
54 Christopher M. Blanchard, “Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations” (Washington: Congressional 
Research Service, February 18, 2020). 
55 Ibid, 36. 
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only a small fraction of the current U.S.-Saudi agreements. 56 Figure 2.3 shows Saudi 
Arabia’s FMS deliveries and conflict deaths in the country’s region between 1989 and 
2017. 
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As with the global look at FMS and conflict deaths described above, no clear trend emerges 
from Figure 2.3. As in the cases described above, however, key spikes in the two graphs 
highlight important correlations. The first spike occurs in 1991 corresponds with the Gulf 
War. At that time, Saudi Arabia allied with the U.S. to fight against Iraq and a clear link 
exists between U.S. investment and conflict deaths, which account for the majority of the 
deaths in the dataset for 1991. The direct relationship between FMS to Saudi Arabia and 
conflict deaths in Iraq is hard to parse given the large coalition that opposed Iraq, but the 
successive trend is the significant story here. Although the Gulf War was short lived, it 
started a trend of FMS investment in Saudi Arabia that saw significant deliveries for the 
 














































rest of the 1990s. This demonstrates the U.S. policy of supporting regional allies in the 
wake of the war as well as Saudi Arabia’s commitment to arming with U.S. weapons.  
 After the Gulf War, conflict related deaths in the region dropped below 10,000 per 
year after the Gulf war and remained relatively low for almost two decades. Starting in 
2000, Saudi FMS deliveries were reduced and stayed relatively low until 2013, when 
another spike in both FMS deliveries and conflict deaths occurred. Another spike in 
conflict related deaths occurred in 2013 because of the Syrian civil war, which began in 
2011. U.S.-Saudi cooperation in backing Syrian rebels provides context for these increases 
as both countries sought to limit the Iran backed regime.57 While U.S. weapons in the hands 
of Saudis are not the primary driver of deaths in Syria, Saudi Arabia is certainly amassing 
arms in light of this escalating conflict in the hopes of countering Iran’s influence across 
the gulf region.  
 The trend observed in the Saudi data below likens Saudi engagement with FMS to 
the Georgia case described earlier. It is unlikely that Saudi FMS purchases, or Saudi 
hostility in any context, are a primary driver of conflict deaths in the region during this 
period. Saudi Arabia has taken steps to arm itself, however, during periods of increased 
conflict and this can be seen in periods where Saudi purchases using the FMS program 
increased during and immediately after regional conflicts. As such, there does seem to be 
a relationship between FMS deliveries and conflict deaths, but it does not appear causative 








 In 1991, Ukraine gained its independence with the fall of the Soviet Union. It 
received its first FMS delivery in 2000. Since that time, Ukrainian expenditures on FMS 
have fluctuated wildly. It is worth noting that Ukraine does have some local weapons 
production capacity and is also a notable arms exporter, including exports to Russia prior 
to 2014.58 Similar to nearby Georgia, Ukraine accepted its first FMS delivery in the 
immediate aftermath of the Second Chechen War. As shown in Figure 2.4, this began a 
period in which Ukraine has engaged with the FMS program at some level in every year 
since. 
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It is tempting to view Ukraine’s FMS deliveries beginning in 2000 as a reaction to 
Russian hostilities on their Southern border. Given that Ukraine exported weapons to 
Russia until 2014, however, any concerns about Russian activity seem to be a poor 
explanation for Ukraine’s engagement with the FMS program. Differences in Ukrainian 
and U.S. weapons production must be considered, however, as weapons obtained from the 
U.S. are generally high-tech countermeasures that would uniquely limit Russian 
capabilities in an invasion, such as javelin anti-tank missiles.59 Ukrainian weapons 
production and exports to Russia would do little to tip the balance in favor of either side 
but would serve to boost Ukraine’s treasury.  
 In 2014, the narrative changes with the Russian annexation of Crimea. A trend 
emerges in Figure 2.4 and most of the regional conflict deaths in 2014 occurred in Ukraine 
as the result of Russian hostility. Not surprisingly, FMS deliveries to Ukraine spike in 2014 
and increase in 2015, likely a result of continued Russian hostility. Much like FMS 
engagement with Saudi Arabia in the wake of the Gulf War, the U.S. and Ukraine share 
policy motives for increasing sales in the face of Russian aggression. It is also clear in this 
case that conflict deaths drove FMS expenditures rather than FMS expenditures driving 
combat deaths since the majority of conflict deaths in 2014 were on the Ukrainian side. If 
FMS deliveries had the desired deterrent effect in this conflict and played a part in curbing 
Russian hostility, it is possible to argue that the deliveries made to Ukraine in 2014 and 
2015 may have limited conflict and reduced deaths.  
 
59 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Ukraine – Javelin Missiles and Command Launch Units,” 




 Despite Ukraine’s erratic FMS spending patterns, the link between FMS and 
conflict deaths in 2014 provides a clear, and easily explained correlation that fits with 
patterns like those observed in Saudi Arabia. Having most of the conflict deaths in the 
region occur on the Ukrainian side acts as a control allowing for the elimination of any 
concern FMS deliveries that year were used to cause conflict deaths. The pattern of 
deliveries coming as a reaction to conflict fits with previously examined examples 
including Ethiopia, Georgia, and Saudi Arabia during both the 1991 Gulf War and Syrian 
Civil War. The pattern that begins to emerge is one of FMS deliveries as the product of 
regional conflict rather than as a driver.  
Taiwan 
 Southeast Asia, which for this case study, includes Taiwan, China, Vietnam, The 
Philippines, North and South Korea, and Japan, generally has few conflict deaths. It is 
worth noting that obtaining accurate data about conflict deaths in a country like North 
Korea is quite difficult, particularly if such deaths were the result of civil unrest. Similar 
problems exist for China. Although it is tempting to look for correlations in the data 
presented in Figure 2.5 below, it should be noted that almost all the conflict deaths in this 
figure occurred in the Philippines and were the result of civil unrest. Filipino conflict is 
unlikely to be a significant driver of Taiwanese defense spending, however, and given the 
low level of conflict deaths overall, this simply is not a compelling explanation for 
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Taiwan has been a reliable and relatively high spender on FMS acquisitions, 
however, with more than 1 billion dollars in purchases in 11 separate years since 1989. 
Given Taiwan’s contentious relationship with China, its desire to obtain large quantities of 
technologically sophisticated weapons should come as no surprise. The nature of a war 
with China, if one were to break out, can also help explain Taiwan’s high expenditure 
relative to a country like Ukraine. While Ukraine might be able to resist Russian aggression 
with guerilla or insurgent forces armed only with small arms, a war with China on the small 
island of Taiwan would certainly involve sea and air components. This requires significant 
numbers of expensive planes and ships. Not surprisingly, this has been the focus of many 
of Taiwan’s acquisitions.60  
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Figure 2.5: Taiwan FMS Deliveries and Conflict Deaths 





 Although there is no plausible link between conflict deaths and FMS where Taiwan 
is concerned, Taiwan’s engagement with the FMS program still fits into the context of the 
previously discussed cases. As with the cases above where sales seem to function more 
often as deterrence for existing conflict rather than as a cause for additional violence, FMS 
to Taiwan act to deter the possibility of Chinese aggression. Just as the U.S. acts to counter 
Iran in the Gulf region due to oil interests, the South China Sea offers crucial shipping lanes 
for global trade. Rather than see China cement control of the region, the U.S. benefits from 
aiding those who oppose Chinese control of these trade routes. Taiwan, of course, needs 
military aid to protect its sovereignty from mainland China, and clearly shows its 
willingness to pay for that privilege. Although not an official U.S. policy position, the U.S. 
commitment to what it describes as Taiwan’s “self-defense” seem to be a tacit effort to 
dissuade China from launching any hostile military action in the region.61 These sales to 
Taiwan serve to deter conflict, not cause it. 
Conclusion 
 At this level of analysis, there is no observable, direct correlation between FMS 
deliveries and conflict deaths. A lack of such correlation places arguments that suggest 
high levels of weapons are likely to be related to increases in bloody conflicts on shaky 
ground. In places like Taiwan, billions of dollars in weapons spending have not amounted 
to any notable changes in conflict deaths. Conversely, countries like Ethiopia, have seen 
significant numbers of conflict deaths even before an influx of weapons, the receipt of 
which would still put the Ethiopian arsenal well below that of countries like Taiwan.  
 
61 Susan V. Lawrence and Wayne M. Morrison, “Taiwan: Issues for Congress,” (Washington: 
Congressional Research Service, October 30, 2017): 29. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44996.pdf.  
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 Examining the data provided above does offer some interesting insights into how 
countries utilize the FMS program and its relation to conflict. In the data above, there were 
six instances where significant increases in conflict deaths and FMS deliveries 
corresponded. Two in the global data, two for Saudi Arabia, and two for the Ukraine. If 
these six instances have anything in common, it is that the FMS deliveries almost certainly 
did not play a major role in the conflict deaths. In some cases, this can be determined 
because of the timing of the deliveries relative to deaths and, in others, it is because we can 
conclusively rule out the FMS recipient as the hostile actor. The latter applies Ukraine in 
2014, which we know did not kill its own people with weapons received that year.62 The 
much more plausible explanation in almost every case is that countries tend to build up 
their military forces and engage with programs such as FMS as the result of conflict in their 
region. Some countries, like Eritrea and Taiwan, manage to do this preemptively but often 
conflict occurs, people die, and then countries appear encouraged to obtain more weapons 
as a result.  
 Whether a country engages with the FMS program as a reaction to conflict in their 
region or as deterrent to conflict, as Taiwan does, FMS may still contribute to conflict 
deaths. One possible example in the cases above is Saudi Arabia. Although it is clear that 
Saudi Arabia significantly boosted its arsenal with U.S. weapons in the wake of the Gulf 
War, this may have put the Saudis in a position to involve themselves in the Syrian Civil 
War years later. An examination of more recent data would likely put this in even starker 
terms with the war in Yemen. Saudi conduct there has been one of the major points of 
criticism against the FMS program in recent years.63 Although this study focused on FMS 
 
62 Lacina, Bethany and Nils Petter Gleditsch, “Monitoring Trends in Global Combat,” (2005).  
63 Richard F. Grimmett (2009): 1-2. 
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and conflict deaths on a year-to-year basis, one of the challenges with arms transfers is a 
loss of accountability once these articles are in foreign hands. This challenge only grows 
with time.  
 There are a number of limitations in this chapter which must be discussed both in 
terms of methodology and scope. On the issue of methodology, the simplicity stands out 
as the most glaring handicap. It should be noted that the data presented above serves to 
spark a qualitative discussion surrounding the relationship between FMS and conflict 
deaths rather than to present definitive data linking or dissociating the two. More rigorous 
economic models capable of accounting for inflation, the size of FMS recipient economies, 
and pegging the relationship between the two variables at specific values would serve to 
make quantitative conclusions on the subject. As noted at the outset, at least one study has 
produced results by interpreting DCS and civil conflict through economic modelling. 
Quantitative models that could control for additional variables, such as a country’s budget 
constraints or spending before and after conflict would also provide important insight.  
 Expanding the scope of data would also help make stronger conclusions in future 
studies. Chapter three examines several countries’ entire military budgets and additional 
studies examining macro data would undoubtedly produce connections that have been 
overlooked here. Future studies should also consider how conflict influences weapons 
imports across entire regions and consider comparative analysis of high spending and low 
spending regions. Additional analysis of high spending, low conflict regions and low 
spending, high conflict regions would likely yield the most fruitful results for those 





















Where the previous chapter specifically examined the links between Foreign 
Military Sales and conflict deaths, this chapter seeks to explore the relationship between 
conflict deaths and countries’ overall levels of military spending. In other words, do high 
levels of military spending lead to high levels of conflict deaths? The Foreign Military 
Sales program did not appear to be linked to with increases in conflict deaths but a broader 
look at a country’s entire military budget is likely to provide more insight into how 
spending patterns may be connected to conflict violence. In a world of ever-increasing 
military spending,64 such insight should be of significance to military and budgetary policy 
makers in almost every country.   
Military spending is among a small and unique group of public expenditures, 
including prisons and police, where government money can be used to kill. Obviously, 
military spending can do much more than just kill, and many would make the argument 
 
64 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,” (Stockholm: 
SIPRI, 2020) https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex. 
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that high levels of military expenditure may serve to reduce the risk of conflict overall.65 
Those arguing this position would maintain that high military spending neither causes 
conflict nor increases conflict violence. None the-less, government funded killing, even if 
only funding the capability to do so, is of scholarly interest based on its unique nature.  
 This chapter begins with a literature review discussing recent and relatively broad 
scholarship that highlights the importance of economic factors in conflicts as well as the 
relatively sparse literature specifically linking spending to conflict violence. It continues 
with a look at global military expenditure data and global conflict deaths over the past 30 
years. This section also includes a discussion of spending and conflict data from Rwanda, 
which presents itself as a significant outlier in the data due to the high number of deaths 
attributed to genocide in that country. The succeeding sections present four cases along 
with the relevant data and discussion. Ethiopia and Israel are grouped together as countries 
that face primarily external threats, while Colombia and Sri Lanka are grouped together 
because their primary security concern is internal insurgency. While these countries have 
been selected based on the unique security threats they face, these four countries also each 
occupy a distinct geographic region with unique security concerns, and all have data 
available for the years in question. The chapter concludes with a discussion of avenues for 
further exploration. 
The Causes of Conflict and Their Economic Nexus 
 
Numerous scholars make the case that economic factors are significant in conflict. 
Few, however, argue that military spending directly drives violence. In this regard, the 
 
65 Michael E. O’Hanlon and Frank A. Rose, “Democratic presidential candidates shouldn’t give into the 





work of Carrie A. Lee stands out below as the only author to specifically link increased 
spending to increased violence. There are related scholars, however, that do suggest that 
money is related to causing both war and peace. Lee and these scholars, collectively 
referred to here as “Financial Determinists,” argue that direct links between money and 
conflict do exist. The second group of scholars, or “Resource Theorists,” argue that 
struggle over resources such as oil and land are conflict’s primary drivers. The final branch 
of scholarship discussed are those who focus primarily on poverty. All three schools of 
thought, despite their differences, make the case that economic factors are closely 
connected to conflict. As a result, these scholars collectively further the case for exploring 
the links between money and conflict in more detail.  
Financial Determinists 
There are scholars who have staked out somewhat definitive positions relating 
money to conflict. The most distinctive camps within this scholarship argue a direct 
connection between money and conflict with one camp arguing that money leads to conflict 
and escalating violence while the other argues that money ends conflict and leads to peace. 
Even among writers who agree regarding the impact of money on conflict, various 
mechanisms explaining this impact are offered.  
A good non-scholarly example of this argument can be seen in John Steele 
Gordon’s article “The High Cost of War.”66 Gordon describes the U.S. Civil War and its 
spectacular and escalating cost by the standards of the time. He focuses on its unique 
position as “the first great conflict of the industrial era,”67 and describes the differences in 
 





economic models used by the Union and Confederacy to fund the conflict. His conclusion 
is that the Union won the war having been able to raise more money and outspend the 
Confederacy. Gordon makes no claim, however, regarding whether the Civil War’s high 
spending lead to increased violence or a merciful end to a conflict that otherwise may have 
claimed more lives.  
Where Gordon seizes on the Industrial Revolution and manufacturing for his 
explanation, Nicola Gennaioli focuses on the Military Revolution as a key element to 
increasing military budgets and the ability of nations to turn the tide of war through 
financial means. Gennaioli’s article “State Capacity and Military Conflict” defines the 
Military Revolution as a period roughly corresponding with the widespread adoption of 
gunpowder between 1400 and 1600 in which centralized states with growing bureaucracies 
began to field large professional armies.68 Gennaioli’s argument is among the most 
nuanced as he notes two distinct but interrelated effects of money on conflict. Gennaioli 
argues that weak states, all spending little on conflict are likely to fight often. As states 
begin to spend more on conflict, states may be further incentivized to fight due to 
imbalances in their military budgets. This would increase conflict temporarily. Once strong 
centralized states have accomplished their military aims and weak states, unable to keep 
up financially, withdraw from competition, conflict would decrease. 
Gennaioli’s assertion that increasing military spending can both increase and 
decrease conflict depending on exogenous factors ties nicely into the arguments of Erik 
Gartzke and William Reed who both argue that increased spending leads to less conflict. 
Unlike Gennaioli, neither Gartzke nor Reed focus specifically on military expenditure but 
 
68 Nicola Gennaioli, and Hans-Joachim Voth, “State Capacity and Military Conflict.” The Review of 
Economic Studies 82, no. 4 (293) (2015): 1413. Accessed June 18, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/43869472. 
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both argue that capitalist countries with interconnected economies are less likely to go to 
war. Reed specifically focuses on uncertainty as a cause of conflict in his article 
“Information and Economic Interdependence” and argues that countries with strong 
economic ties are more likely to understand each other’s motivations, thereby avoiding 
serious conflict.69 Similarly, Gartzke argues that capitalism allows economies to develop 
in ways that disincentivize conflict by placing less importance on the possession of land, 
increasing soft power, and providing an avenue for non-violent competition.70 In total, 
these scholars all demonstrate the high level of interrelation between economics, finance, 
and conflict despite their various views on how they relate and to what end.  
The study that stands out for the very direct relationship it demonstrates between 
military expenditure and conflict violence is Carrie A. Lee’s “Use it or Lose It: The 
Political Economy of Counterinsurgency Strategy.”71 Lee’s study is very narrow when 
compared to those discussed above, looking only at U.S. spending by junior officers in 
combat zones and the resultant violence in those areas. While this study focuses on the 
tactical level of expenditure and violence and does little to explain conflict writ large, 
particularly between nations, it does demonstrate a link between increased military 
spending and violence making it unique within this field. 
Resource Theorists 
David Jerome’s Examining War and Conflict Around the World begins with this 
simple premise: “People are different,” he writes, “and that difference will cause 
 
69 Reed, William. “Information and Economic Interdependence.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 47, no. 1 
(February 2003): 54-71. doi:10.1177.0022002702239511.  
70 Erik Gartzke, "The Capitalist Peace," American Journal of Political Science 51, no. 1 (2007): 166-167. 
Accessed June 18, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/4122913. 
71 Carrie A. Lee, and John Kendall, “Use It or Lose It: The Political Economy of Counterinsurgency 




conflict.”72 Jerome continues his argument writing that “a nation will seek… to acquire the 
necessary resources needed for sustainment and survival.”73 Jerome also includes a lengthy 
list of the causes of conflict but does not directly refer to economics, GDP, or military 
expenditure. This is common within conflict scholarship, many possible causes are 
discussed, the specter of financing said conflicts is always present, but the financing itself 
is rarely considered causative. Jerome’s “necessary resources” are ambiguous. They could 
be weapons and the money needed to buy them but he could also be referring to human 
capital, land, food, or any number of other necessities. Given Jerome’s list of causative 
factors, it seems the possession of weapons and ability to finance the same would be low 
on his list of “necessary resources” if they ranked at all. The ability to finance conflict does 
fit into the conflict studies discipline, however, and other scholars do relate economics to 
the causes of conflict.  
Among the most common explanations for conflict, particularly among scholars 
who seek to explain the genesis and locations of conflicts around the world, is the unequal 
distribution of resources. As Francis-Vincent Anthony describes in his chapter “Causes of 
Interreligious Conflict,” “…conflict arises from competition for scarce resources like 
economic wealth or political power.”74 Although these arguments often focus on the 
possession or control of physical resources, there is an implicit link between resource 
possession and wealth. Konrad Stańczyk75 makes this connection in his article “Current 
 
72 David Jerome, ed., Examining War and Conflict Around the World, (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2019): 
xi. Accessed June 16, 2020. ProQuest Ebook Central. 
73 Ibid.  
74 Francis-Vincent Anthony, et al., “Causes of Interreligious Conflict,” In Religion and Conflict Attribution: 
An  Empirical Study of the Religious Meaning System of Christian, Muslim and Hindu Students in Tamil 
Nadu, India, (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2015): 169. Accessed June 19, 2020. 
www.jstor.org/stable/10.1163/j.ctt1w76vhj.11. 
75 Konrad Stańczyk, “Current Trends in World Defence Expenditure,” Revista Academiei Fortelor Terestre 
19, no. 3 (October 2014): 313–18. 
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Trends in World Defense Expenditure” which argues that countries with high military 
budgets have either high GDP or oil revenue or exist in high conflict regions. Essentially, 
countries spend on defense because they can or because, as Jerome argues, they must.  
 Among scholars who focus on resource dependent explanations of conflict, 
numerous articles specifically address the impact of oil. Articles such as Shiping Tang’s 
“Does Oil Cause Ethnic War?”76 and Michael L. Ross’s “Blood Barrels: Why Oil Wealth 
Fuels Conflict”77 make the argument that oil either causes or exacerbates conflict. Ross 
and Tang both argue that oil and its related wealth can contribute to existing tensions 
between ethnic groups or within weak economic or political systems but as Ross writes, 
“oil alone cannot create conflict.”78 This oil-centric argument fits with the analysis of 
Jerome in that oil helps countries obtain the “necessary resources” he describes. Taken 
together with Stańczyk’s argument, one could claim a more direct link between oil revenue, 
high military budgets, and high levels of conflict. This argument fits better with Ross’s 
analysis, however, as Ross focuses more on the financial impact of oil sales on violence. 
Tang, on the other hand, discusses asymmetric resource distribution which would suggest 
that arguments linking high levels of expenditure to high levels of conflict would rarely 
apply to both sides of a conflict involving oil.79 Similar arguments can be found among 
scholars who link other economic explanations to their more fundamental theories 





76 Shiping Tang et al., “Does Oil Cause Ethnic War? Comparing Evidence from Process-Tracing with 
Quantitative Results,” Security Studies 26, no. 3 (July 1, 2017): 359–90. 
77 Michael L. Ross, "Blood Barrels: Why Oil Wealth Fuels Conflict," Foreign Affairs 87, no. 3 (2008): 2-8. 
78 Ibid, 4.  
79 Shiping Tang, “Does Oil Cause Ethnic War,” (2017): 388-389.  
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Poverty and Developmentalists 
Hossein Askari seems to echo the biblical sentiment of “beating swords into 
ploughshares”80 in the introduction of his 2012 book Conflicts and Wars: Their Fallout 
and Prevention. Askari describes high global military expenditures as the “miraculous pool 
of funds [that] exists before our very eyes.”81 Askari lays the blame for global conflict at 
the feet of leaders who he argues make the final decision to engage in conflict or avoid it 
but his argument nonetheless draws a clear connection between conflict and expenditure. 
Askari’s argument does not clarify whether he believes that military expenditure causes 
conflict or succeeds it but he seems to imply the former. His overarching argument, 
however, is primarily focused on the economic benefits of reducing conflict.  
Alex Braithwaite inverts this argument in his article, “Does Poverty Cause 
Conflict?” Braithwaite demonstrates a link between poverty and civil war arguing that 
impoverished countries are more conflict prone.82 While the cases described in this article 
hardly fit with Askari’s argument and its predication on expensive great power 
competition, Braithwaite’s conclusion is strikingly similar. Where Askari argues for 
reducing military expenditure to divert resources to addressing civil issues, Braithwaite 
argues for addressing civil issues to reduce conflict (which would presumably reduce 
military expenditure as a byproduct).   
 
80 The Bible: Authorized King James Version, ed. Robert Carroll, and Stephen Prickett, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. Oxford Scholarly Editions Online, 2012): Isaiah 2:4. 
10.1093/actrade/9780199535941.book.1. 
81 Hossein Askari, Conflicts and Wars: Their Fallout and Prevention. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2012): 5.  
82 Alex Braithwaite et al., “Does Poverty Cause Conflict? Isolating the Causal Origins of the Conflict 




Given the literature discussed above, there are numerous plausible explanations for 
the cause of conflict. Although not all scholars point to economic explanations for conflict, 
resources are almost always part of the equation. As a result, money seems constantly in 
the background of this debate, even if sometimes only implicitly. While economic 
explanations may not be able to explain why conflicts begin or end, it is plausible that 
measuring a country’s expenditure, particularly where it specifically relates to military 
activity, would have some value in understanding how conflicts are likely to play out in a 
given region and how violent they may be. The remainder of this paper will be focused on 
beginning to understand what the link is between military expenditure and conflict is, and 
how changes in expenditure impact conflict violence.  
Note on Methodology 
 The data for this study comes from the Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute (SIPRI) and the University of Uppsala’s Uppsala Conflict Data Program. These 
two sources provide the data presented for global military expenditure and conflict deaths, 
respectively. For the purposes of visualization and discussion, the two data sets have been 
complied into various graphs, which are presented below.  
 While military expenditure data is taken directly from the SIPRI database for each 
country, death data is compiled for each country and includes neighboring countries with 
which that country shares borders. While this is an imperfect way of measuring deaths, 
particularly as they may or may not relate to military expenditures, this method provides 
several advantages over looking at a country in isolation or attempting to link a country to 
every other country where it may conceivably influence a conflict. First, including only 
deaths that are recorded in a particular country would greatly suppress deaths that are, in 
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many cases, clearly related to a given country’s military operations. Taking Ethiopia as an 
example, numerous deaths from its war with Eritrea would be left out, since they did not 
occur on Ethiopian soil. Conversely, attempting to trace every expeditionary operation of 
a large military would be outside the scope of what this study can hope to accomplish. 
Apart from the U.S. and other large powers, the use of expeditionary military force beyond 
adjacent countries is generally limited. In the cases examined below, with the exception of 
Israel, this is particularly the case. As a result, this study only accounts for deaths in each 
country and their adjacent neighbors. 
It is true that this methodology may overstate deaths in relation to a country that 
clearly did not contribute to them militarily. This is the case in the discussion of Israel and 
Syrian deaths below. These death totals are still included, however, as they relate to a 
broader discussion regarding military spending and how it may be impacted by a country’s 
overall security environment. The qualitative discussion accompanying each case should 
allow the reader to evaluate these cases where the data may otherwise be misleading.  
 Correlation coefficients have been calculated for each region and country discussed 
based on the annual expenditure and deaths. These correlation coefficients are discussed at 
several points below and do help illustrate the arguments made in certain cases. The use of 
such figures should not be taken to suggest, however, that this study intends to prove a 
calculable relationship between military expenditure and conflict deaths. As discussed in 
chapter two, correlation does not imply causation. Where such relationships indicate 
interesting points for discussion and qualitative analysis, however, they are introduced.  
 It should also be noted that, despite the use of graphs and some inclusions of 
statistics, this paper is still primarily qualitative in nature. The graphs below are presented 
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to help illustrate relationships visually and to launch qualitative discussion that may better 
explain how military expenditure impacts conflict deaths and provide a foundation upon 
which to continue further inquiry. 
Global Trends in Military Expenditure and Conflict Deaths  
The data in chapter two suggests that increased weapons deliveries often occurred 
near the end of conflicts. That insight alone does little to answer the larger question as to 
whether such military expenditures increase conflict death tolls or serve to end conflicts 
that may otherwise forge ahead with their bloody business. This chapter attempts to 
broaden the scope of chapter two by examining countries’ entire military budgets in the 
hopes of drawing more conclusive links between military spending and conflict deaths.  
A slight negative correlation exists (correlation coefficient of -0.11) between global 
military expenditure and global conflict deaths between 1988 and 2019 as shown in Figure 
3.1. Taken without further exploration, this would suggest that if military spending had any 
impact on conflict it would marginally suppress it.  
83 
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It should be noted, however, that according to the SIPRI data on which this graph is based, 
the U.S. and China account for 52 percent of global military expenditure. Such a massive 
inequity in military budgets likely masks trends that would otherwise be apparent as 
smaller changes in spending are smoothed over by top heavy spending from larger powers. 
As a result, to understand and make sense of any relationship between military spending 
and conflict deaths, it is important to observe regional as well as country specific trends.  
A similar trend emerges when examining the death data. The 1994 Rwandan 
genocide creates an outlier that heavily affects the data. With that specific event removed 
from the dataset the negative correlation between military budgets and conflict deaths goes 
from -0.10 to 0.27 and controlling for all one-sided conflict the correlation increases again 
to 0.32. In other words, what starts as a negative correlation bordering on randomness 
becomes and slightly, though still not statistically significant,84 positive one.  
The data in Figure 3.1 do not help to illustrate any relationship between global 
expenditure and conflict deaths. This should perhaps come as no surprise given the 
incredible diversity of conflicts globally. Even looking primarily at factors within the scope 
of this study, military budgets vary greatly between continents and countries and death tolls 
may be driven by famine or disease as much as by bullets and bombs. As a result, in 
discussing the connection between military budgets and conflict deaths, smaller regional 
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84 For this paper, correlation of 0.7 or -0.7 is deemed significant see: Diana Mindrila and Phoebe Balentyne, 




and country specific analysis are more instructive and allow for a measure of control over 
exogenous factors that may otherwise make the data hard to interpret or misleading.  
 The 31-year period discussed herein, the years for which reliable data is best 
available, provides several case studies that make themselves immediately apparent.  
Deaths related to both inter and intrastate military conflict over the past 31 years have 
generally remained below 100,000 per year. In some cases, such as between 2001 and 
2011, conflict deaths have been much lower. Spikes during this period have generally been 
driven by specific, regionally isolated conflicts. The spike in deaths in 1994 can be 
attributed to the Rwandan genocide.85 The increase after 2012 is primarily the result of the 
Syrian Civil War, which began in 2011,86 and the Yemen Civil War, which began in 2015.87 
Rwanda offers an interesting case, despite being a country with low military spending and 
an outlier because of the Rwandan Civil War’s high death toll. Although there is little 
statistical correlation between Rwanda’s military spending and conflict deaths, several 
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Removing the almost 500,000 deaths attributed to the genocide of the Tutsi 
population, there is still a notable increase in both spending and deaths at the beginning of 
the Rwandan Civil War in 1990. Similarly, as the deaths increased with fighting spilling 
into the Congo in 1996,88 Rwanda also increased its expenditure more than double from 40 
to 100 million. After 2001, Rwanda’s military budget seems to stabilize despite 
fluctuations in annual regional deaths and has slowly trend upwards since, totaling over 
120 million dollars in 2017. These patterns suggest crisis spending during the civil war. 
 
88 Pamela D. Couture, “Demystifying the War in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” Journal of Pastoral 













































































































The post-2001 budget stabilization is likely the result of a reduced conflict environment 
coupled with the rule of President Kagame who took office in 2000.89 Despite the outlier 
related to the 1994 genocide, Rwandan military expenditure demonstrates a pattern of 
spikes related to military operations which are visible in the annual data. This trend can 
also be observed in Ethiopia, which is discussed below.   
 Unfortunately, similar analyses cannot be conducted for the other two countries 
with high conflict death tolls from the global data presented in Figure 3.1. No reliable 
military expenditure data is available for Syria. Yemeni data is only available from 1990 
to 2014, while a significant number of deaths in that civil war have occurred since 2014.  
Unlike the cases of Rwanda, Syria, or Yemen with their remarkably high death 
tolls, the following case studies have been selected specifically for their relevance to this 
study’s methodology and the broad applicability of any observations they yield. All four 
cases described below, Israel, Ethiopia, Colombia, and Sri Lanka, were selected due to the 
availability of data for the years in question as well as for regional diversity.  Sri Lanka 
also offers a unique case due to its isolated nature and the intense civil war there, which 













Positive Correlations, External Threats 
The continent of Africa has a slight negative correlation between military 
expenditure and conflict deaths. This has mostly been driven by the continent’s ballooning 
military expenditures  
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after 2002, while conflict deaths have remained relatively low as can be seen in Figure 3.3. 
Two significant spikes in deaths can also be observed in this figure, one in 1990 and the 
other in 1999 and 2000, both of which correspond to conflict in Ethiopia and Eritrea. Only 
the 1999 spike in deaths correlates to a slight increase in spending continent wide. As 


















































































































Author compilation of data from: Global conflict death data is from: Therese Pettersson 
and Magnus Öberg, “Organized violence, 1989-2019,” Journal of Peace Research 57 no.4 
(2020). Ralph Sundberg and Erik Melander “Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event 
Dataset,” Journal of Peace Research 50 no.4 (2013). Global military expenditure data is 
from: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “SIPRI Military Expenditure 
Database,” (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2020) https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex. 
 
 With a correlation coefficient of 0.77, Ethiopia provides the most statistically 
significant case in this study linking military expenditure to conflict deaths. Visually, it is 
easy to see how Ethiopian military spending tracks closely with conflict deaths in the 
region. Two significant factors should be noted here. First, Ethiopia was directly involved 
in both conflicts that drove spikes in deaths visible in Figure 3.4. Second, Ethiopia’s 
military budget outside of these conflicts has been relatively stable hovering between 300 
and 500 million for 16 out of the 29 years depicted. This contrasts with global defense 
spending patterns that have generally trended higher since 2000, a pattern that is reflected 
in Figure 3.3’s data for Africa. 
 Another trend that emerges here is that spending often begins to increase prior to 
the most violent years. As Figure 3.4 shows, a high level of spending in 1989 preceded a 
particularly violent year in 1990. Similarly, spending began to increase in 1997 and 1998 











































































































the Rwandan spending patterns in Figure 3.2. This is the opposite of the trend observed in 
chapter two, where Foreign Military Sales often succeeded conflict deaths. This may be 
the result of a lag in appropriations or variances in countries accounting for annual 
spending but is not necessarily inconsistent. For example, the large increase in Ethiopian 
military spending in 1998 corresponds to with a U.S.-Ethiopia arms deal, discussed in 
chapter two, which was delivered in 2000 and corresponds with the high number of deaths 
that year. Despite a clear relationship between spending and deaths in Ethiopia, the 
question remains about long-term spending impacts. While it is clear spending preceded 
deaths in this case, much more detailed study would be needed to conclude how much 
spending caused deaths that may have otherwise be prevented or whether such expenditure 
may have saved lives by ending the conflict earlier.  
 Israel provides another case with a similarly strong correlation between military 


























Author compilation of data from: Global conflict death data is from: Therese Pettersson 
and Magnus Öberg, “Organized violence, 1989-2019,” Journal of Peace Research 57 
no.4 (2020). Ralph Sundberg and Erik Melander “Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced 
Event Dataset,” Journal of Peace Research 50 no.4 (2013). Global military expenditure 
data is from: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “SIPRI Military 
Expenditure Database,” (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2020) https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex. 
 
 
Conflict deaths in Israel’s region have fluctuated wildly having jumped from a low of 27 
in 2010 to over 40,000 in 2012, largely due to conflict in neighboring Syria. Israel also has 
a relatively high level of military spending, especially compared to African nations, having 
never spent less than 10 billion dollars since 1989. Israel also finds itself hemmed in by 
hostile powers, which it views as a threat to its very existence.90 This contrasts with a 
country like Ethiopia, which is located in a volatile region with neighboring Sudan and 
Somalia, does not face an existential threat from either. As a result, Israel’s national 
security situation is quite different from those examined thus far.  
 
90 Michael I. Handel, Perception, Deception and Surprise: The Case of the Yom Kippur War, (Jerusalem: 













































































































 Despite Israel’s modest correlation between expenditure and deaths, it seems that 
much of this relationship is incidental. In addition to Israel’s relatively high level of annual 
military spending, the country’s spending has generally trended higher over time with few 
notable spikes. This spending pattern seems to match the global and regional trend. The 
spike in deaths in Israel’s region after 2011 is largely tied to the civil war in Syria which 
began in that year. Although Israel has had some incidental involvement in Syria since the 
war began, mostly on the humanitarian front,91 it does not seem to be a significant driver 
of Israeli military operations or spending. As a result, Israeli expenditures, while continuing 
to increase year over year, sees no significant movement in concert with the skyrocketing 
death toll in Syria. 
Similarly, it would be difficult to argue that the primary driver of the increased 
spending for the Middle East as a whole, seen in Figure 3.6, could possibly have been 
driven by a coming war in Syria. Such conflict would have been difficult to predict even if 
it were likely to drive military spending and it is implausible to assume it would have driven 
the 18 years of increasing  
spending seen between 1996 and 2014. This only furthers the case for Israeli spending 
trending with regional norms rather than being influenced by conflict deaths or used to 
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 There are two significant factors to consider here when comparing this case to that 
of the African nations described above. First is that Israel spends a significant amount of 
money on its military and maintains state of the art missile defense systems, aircraft, and 
highly trained troops at all times.92 As a result, Israel is less likely to need the surge 
spending, even when a conflict breaks out. Second, despite having conflict related deaths 
in the region in every year depicted, some years have been relatively low intensity and the 
highest death tolls have occurred in Syria where Israeli involvement has been minimal. 
 
















































































































 This suggests that correlations between military expenditure and conflict deaths 
may be explained quite differently depending on countries’ policies regarding military 
expenditure as well their security situation. Despite less correlation between spending and 
death in Rwanda, similar patterns of surge spending emerge in the relatively low budgets 
of both Rwanda and Ethiopia. Israel, with its higher budget and increasing expenditure 
need not make significant changes to its military spending even when its region is beset by 
an increase in violence. Similarly, countries like Ethiopia, forced to engage directly with 
enemy combatants appear more likely to increase spending when compared to countries, 
which may find themselves only incidental targets of conflict violence.  
Maintaining High Spending: Internal Conflict and Insurgency 
 
 Colombia exhibits the strongest negative correlation observed in this study. As can 
be seen in Figure 3.7, as Colombian military expenditure has increased, violence has 
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Although some violence in Colombia’s region is related to guerilla movements in other 
countries, such as the Shining Path in Peru, the primary driver of the deaths depicted in 
Figure 3.7 has been the insurgency of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
otherwise known by the Spanish language acronym FARC.  
 Similar to the patterns observed with Israeli military spending, Colombian spending 
has been relatively high and continued to increase steadily since 1989. A pressure 
campaign against the FARC beginning during the presidency of Álvaro Uribe,93 who took 
office in 2002, suppressed FARC activities and conflict deaths in the region. This led to 
peace talks which began in 2012.94 None-the-less, military expenditures in Colombia have 
 
93 June S. Beittel, “Peace Talks in Colombia,” (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 2015): 6. 
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continued to climb. Colombia, much like Israel, represents a high spending country with 
patterns that align with the regional trend of increased military expenditures over time. 
Unlike Israel, where external threats largely drive the need for security related spending, 
Colombia’s biggest threats are internal. Interestingly, this distinction also aligns with 
Colombia’s negative correlation between expenditure and deaths, another contrast with 
Israel. This supports scholarship that suggests internal repression may be achieved through 
increased military spending and foreign military aid.95 In the case of interstate conflict, 
such as with Israel and Ethiopia, military spending aligns more closely with increases in 
violent conflict.  
 Sri Lanka also demonstrates similar violence and spending patterns to Colombia. 
Sri Lanka is an island nation that has a generally positive relationship with its closest 
neighbor, India.96 As a result, Sri Lanka’s primary military concern has been the Tamil 
insurgency. From a statistical perspective, the relationship between military spending in 
Sri Lanka and conflict deaths has been little better than random. The overall pattern, 
however, shows that Sri Lanka has increased spending over time and effectively suppressed 
the insurgency on the island. This is a similar trend to that observed in Colombia.  
 
 
95 Oeindrila Dube, and Suresh Naidu, “Bases, Bullets, and Ballots: The Effect of US Military Aid on 
Political Conflict in Colombia,” Journal of Politics 77, no. 1 (January 1, 2015): 249. 
http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy1.library.jhu.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip,shib&db=ijh&A
N=65.4705&site=ehost-live&scope=site. 
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Figure 3.8 shows Sri Lankan military expenditure tracking closely with conflict 
deaths between 1994 and 2008. A three-year increase in spending preceded the final push 
to eradicate the insurgents in 2009 after which time, fighting ended and spending has 
remained high. Despite Sri Lanka’s low overall expenditure, which has never broken 2 
billion dollars, the spending pattern in Sri Lanka’s post war period is remarkably similar to 
the pattern in Colombia. Sri Lanka has continued to maintain high levels of military 
investment even in a relatively secure environment. Due to the isolated nature of Sri 
Lanka’s conflict, increased spending seen after 2005 is very likely to have contributed to 
the higher death toll as the war ended in 2009.97  Surprisingly, a lack of deaths failed exert 
any influence in subsequent spending. This suggests a similar plan of strategic spending in 
 







































































































both Colombia and Sri Lanka which, having defeated an insurgency, now maintain a 
substantial military deterrence to future uprising.  
Conclusion 
 
Analysis of the data demonstrates the complexity of the connections between 
military expenditure and conflict deaths. Three bottom line conclusions all suggest avenues 
for further research. First, different spending patterns can be observed between countries 
with low military spending and those with high military spending. Low spending countries 
appear more likely to have correlation between military spending and conflict deaths. 
Second, countries facing primarily internal security threats, such as insurgencies, appear to 
have the strongest negative correlations between military spending and conflict deaths. 
That is, as these countries spend more, conflict deaths there tend to decrease. Finally, there 
seems to be a trend of significant increases in military spending over the past decade, which 
appears regionally and in all but one of the countries discussed above, even while conflict 
deaths have remained at relatively low levels.  
The most obvious observation made above is that military spending has increased 
over the past 30 years almost everywhere. This holds true for global and regional spending. 
Even a slight dip in African spending over the past five years does little to obscure the 
overall trend visible there and spending has also increased in South Asia, Latin America, 
and the Middle East. In some ways, this general increase in spending may serve to hide 
trends, which would otherwise be more easily related to increases or decreases. It is 
significant that the strongest positive correlation between military expenditure and conflict 
deaths was visible in Ethiopia, which has the lowest military budget in this study and is the 
only country to buck the larger trend of increased military spending in its post war period.  
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 The strong correlation between military expenditure and conflict deaths in the case 
of Ethiopia may appear to some as being indicative of poor policy. After all, what country 
wants to be blamed for their budget increase directly relating to the deaths of their citizens 
and neighbors? It may be, however, that Ethiopia is turning more of its budget towards the 
proverbial plowshares during peacetime. This is as likely a function of necessity as it is a 
policy decision. Compare Ethiopia to Sri Lanka, for example, and it is unlikely Ethiopia 
could sustain similar levels of military spending outside of a crisis. With a relatively similar 
GDP in both countries, the Sri Lankan population is roughly a fifth that of Ethiopia and the 
country is 94 percent smaller.98 
 Future studies may be able to control for the impact of these mismatches in military 
spending to make better comparisons between countries. Further avenues for research 
include grouping countries more selectively by expenditure and comparing countries on 
other economic measures such as GDP. Similarly, studies could focus on conflicts such as 
the U.S. led war in Afghanistan for which granular spending and death data is readily 
available. This would allow for observations of spending patterns without the concealment 
of a country’s high level of non-combat defense spending such as research and 
development or procurements, which are never fielded in combat. A comparison of this 
type in a high spending country like the U.S. or Israel would actually be a better point of 
contrast with a lower spending country like Ethiopia where the majority of military 
spending is driven by specific conflicts.    
 
98 Central Intelligence Agency, “South Asia: Sri Lanka,” The World Factbook (June 29, 2020). 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ce.html; and “Africa: Ethiopia,” The 
World Factbook (July 1, 2020) https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/et.html. 
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 Another significant factor that seems to weigh on countries’ spending patterns is 
the type of conflict in which they are primarily involved. Maintaining high levels of 
spending in Sri Lanka and Colombia seems to have kept gains against insurgents in place 
and held violence at low levels. The external threat environments of Ethiopia and Israel 
seem to make any potential links between spending and deaths less predictable. The 
conclusion here is not surprising, states can exercise more control within their own borders 
than over external events. As a result, high levels of spending correspond with more direct, 
observable impacts on violence when it is primarily contained within the state that hopes 
to control it. This observation is likely to be particularly apt for negative correlations 
between military spending and violence when such spending is used for state repression. 
The next chapter will examine this trend in further detail.  
 Finally, all the countries examined have experienced periods of relative peace over 
the past decade. Even Israel has been relatively stable and although the death toll in 
neighboring Syria has been high, even that has decreased year over year since 2013. While 
military spending may not be the primary driver of this period of peace, it cannot be 
discounted as a potential factor. Given the upward trend in military spending, it may be 
impossible to observe the impact of reduced spending on a large scale. That leaves studies 
like this one to observe smaller countries and make idiosyncratic observations about 
budgets and low-level conflicts. It may be that a spending model like Ethiopia’s could and 
should be adopted more widely but no country that views itself at risk of violent conflict 
would be likely to make that gamble.  
Although the opportunity cost of 2 trillion dollars’ worth of annual military 
expenditure is undoubtedly high, assuming annual conflict deaths can be held to currently 
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levels of below 100,000 per year (a fraction of one percent of the global population) it is 
hard to argue in favor of a change that may upset that balance. Instead, policies should be 
aimed at addressing issues within individual countries to reduce the need for expensive 
internal repression in places like Sri Lanka and Colombia, helping poor countries like 
Ethiopia prevent the costly outbreak of future wars, and ending conflict in places like Syria 
where cost is an unlikely driver of the high death tolls and neighboring countries shoulder 














Insurgency in a modern context conjures images of masked fighters with worn 
Kalashnikov rifles and rocket propelled grenades lurking in dusty shacks in places like 
Mosul or Kandahar. These depictions are probably well-earned and link back at least to 
1980s era Soviet operations in Afghanistan.99 Insurgent tactics and their study, however, 
have a long history dating back at least to the 1880s.100 Insurgent movements can prove 
tenacious and difficult to defeat, as both the Soviet and U.S.  counterinsurgency (COIN) 
efforts in Afghanistan have demonstrated.  
 The tenacity of insurgent movements may account for the lengthy, high cost wars 
needed to defeat them, but as with other forms of conflict, no scholars advocate for 
countries to simply attempt to spend their way out of an insurgency. As with the conflicts 
explored in previous chapters, however, many explanations of successful insurgency and 
counterinsurgency operations suggest that efforts to defeat insurgents require significant 
 
99 Bill Keller, “Home from Afghanistan; Russia's Divisive War.” New York Times, Feb 14, 1988, Late 
Edition (East Coast). 
http://proxy.library.jhu.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/docview/426740889?accountid=11752. 
100 Robert J. Bunker, “Old and New Insurgency Forms,” (Strategic Studies Institute: US Army War 
College, 2016): 2.  http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep11556. 
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funding. It also seems that the best counterinsurgency operations require a delicate 
touch.101 Such theories help explain Soviet and U.S. failures in Afghanistan and informs 
data observations for Iraq and Afghanistan.  
Scholars have identified numerous challenges for counter insurgency operations. 
These include country’s rough terrain, insurgent fighters’ superior local knowledge, the 
ability for insurgents to blend with the local population and avoid detection, and the 
inability for counterinsurgency operatives to win local support.102 Data driven approaches 
have observed trends these variables as they related to insurgent activity even within 
individual countries. Sarah Daly’s “Organizational Legacies of Violence” is one such study 
which describes insurgent trends within Colombian regions that had prior military 
mobilizations. She explains how prior mobilizations increased the chances of developing 
active insurgencies.103 Christopher Blattman’s economically focused “Civil War” also 
extols the value of disaggregated “micro datasets” and seems to lend credence to Daly’s 
method.104 Regardless of which factor, or set of factors, one accepts as the primary driver 
of a given insurgency, it quickly becomes clear that countering insurgents is a military 
challenge of the highest order.       
Understanding how insurgent-driven conflicts end is also important and empirical 
studies have made strides on this front as well. Of particular note is Christopher Paul’s 
2014 “Paths to Victory” which ranks factors leading to the end of insurgency. Paul’s 
 
101 Syed Hussain Shaheed Soherwordi, “US and Pakistani Perspectives on Counter-insurgency in 
Afghanistan,” Pakistan Horizon 66, no. 1/2 (2013): 29-42. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24711490. 
102 Ibid.  
103 Sarah Zukerman Daly, “Organizational Legacies of Violence: Conditions Favoring Insurgency Onset in 
Colombia, 1964-1984.” Journal of Peace Research 49, no. 3 (2012): 473-91. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/41721586. 
104 Christopher Blattman, and Edward Miguel, “Civil War,” Journal of Economic Literature 48, no. 1 
(2010): 34. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40651577. 
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analysis, based on a RAND Corporation study, concludes that insurgency can be defeated 
through a combination of decisive overmatch, reduction of tangible support, and a 
commitment to six or more years of counter-insurgency operations.105 Similar empirical 
studies argue in favor of increased economic development and political factors as 
fundamental elements of limiting insurgent viability.106 It stands to reason, in light of these 
factors, that counter-insurgency operations would be both lengthy and costly. Regardless 
of which factors are most significant for counter insurgents, a lengthy commitment, 
institutional change, and military overmatch are all expensive proposals, even taken 
individually. U.S. experience in both Iraq and Afghanistan bear this out, with nearly 20 
years of fighting and over 2 trillion dollars in expenditure.107 
 In the previous chapter, examining the impact of military budgets showed that while 
broad relationships between spending and conflict deaths were difficult to observe, a 
pattern did begin to emerge in cases where countries’ militaries were primarily engaged in 
repressing internal conflict such as insurgent movements or civil wars. This chapter 
conducts a similar analysis, but with a focus on counter insurgency spending. This serves 
to better explain the patterns observed in chapter two. Examples in this chapter demonstrate 
the impact of military spending on conflict related deaths within the context of counter 
insurgency. 
 
105 Paul, Christopher. “Paths to Victory.” New Zealand International Review 39, no. 3 (2014): 21. 
doi:10.2307/48551470. 
106 See Håvard Hegre, “Peace on Earth?: The Future of Internal Armed Conflict,” Significance 10, no. 1 
(February 2013): 4–8. doi:10.1111/j.1740-9713.2013.00628.x. and Shivaji Mukherjee. “Why Are the 
Longest Insurgencies Low Violence? Politician Motivations, Sons of the Soil, and Civil War Duration.” 
Civil Wars 16, no. 2 (June 2014): 172–207. doi:10.1080/13698249.2014.927702. 
107 See data from Brown University compiled by The Balance: Kimberly Amadeo, “Cost of the Iraq War, 
Its Timeline, and the Economic Impact,” The Balance (August 5, 2020). https://www.thebalance.com/cost-
of-iraq-war-timeline-economic-impact-3306301. and “Afghanistan War Cost, Timeline, and Economic 










 There is a clear discrepancy in looking at military expenditure during the Iraq War. 
The graphs above separate the expenditure between money spent by the Iraqi military and 
that spent by the U.S. military. Importantly, this period includes a transition. In 2003, the 
 
108 Author compilation from: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and the Uppsala Conflict 
Data Program. Individual figures for U.S. expenditure in Afghanistan and Iraq from Amadeo, Kimberly. 
“Cost of the Iraq War, Its Timeline, and the Economic Impact.” The Balance (August 5, 2020). And; 

































































































































































Iraqi government was defending itself against a U.S. invasion, but by 2011, it had switched 
to fighting an insurgency alongside U.S. forces. As the invasion transitioned to a counter-
insurgency operation, expenditure on both sides increased significantly until 2008 with the 
U.S. investing the lions share. Spending declined rapidly after reaching its peak in 2008 
with the Bush administration’s “surge” plan. In 2009, the Obama administration began the 
process of removing troops from Iraq. In 2010, despite the official end of combat 
operations, troops remained on the ground.109 The drawdown helps explain the reduction 
in spending, which tapers off towards the supposed end of combat operations.  
The graph of Iraqi spending, however, demonstrates a pattern similar that observed 
in the previous chapter in Sri Lanka and Colombia. The spending increase leading up to 
2008 correlates with a suppressed death toll. After 2008, Iraq maintained high levels of 
spending while deaths stayed relatively low. It is natural to assume that as the Iraqi 
government recovered after the U.S. invasion and turned its attention towards internal 
security, spending would increase, particularly as U.S. involvement and expenditure was 
reduced. It is significant, however, that Iraq’s military spending during this period does 
strongly correlate with a reduction in violence. It is particularly notable that this reduction 
occurred even as U.S. support decreased both financially and in-kind. In addition to 
aligning with previous observations in Colombia and Sri-Lanka, this also suggests that 
there may be a connection between spending on internal security and counterinsurgency 
that excludes foreign involvement. This makes sense in the context of the 
counterinsurgency goal of building legitimacy and denying legitimacy to insurgents. This 
strategic goal is aided by knowledge of and adherence to “local traditions, customs, norms, 
 
109 Christopher M. Blanchard, “Iraq: Background and U.S. Policy,” (Washington: Congressional Research 
Service, 2017): 46. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45025/4.  
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[and] social structures.”110 Local forces are best positioned to carry out this task and may 
be undermined by perceptions of undue external influence.   
A new distinct phase of conflict in Iraq began in 2014,111 with deaths tolls and Iraqi 
government spending both spiking to levels previously unseen. While the increased deaths 
and spending roughly correlate, this new phase of conflict in Iraq could yet be used to argue 
both sides of the military spending debate. The surge in deaths beginning in 2014 suggests 
increased spending on the part of the Iraq government may have failed to suppress internal 
violence. Despite increased Iraqi spending correlating with positive results up to 2011, the 
decrease in U.S. funding may have left the country ill prepared to handle an eventual surge 
in violence. Enemies of the Iraqi government, like the Islamic State, may have also seen 
decreased U.S. funding as a sign of decreased political will that facilitated bolder military 
operations after the U.S. drawdown. If the rise in deaths and Iraqi government spending is 
followed by a period of relative peace and declining deaths tolls, which appears possible 
considering recent gains against the Islamic State,112 this data may still support continued 
high spending. Questions regarding the relative value of U.S. spending compared to Iraqi 
government spending remain to be answered.  More retrospection is needed with the 
ongoing conflict in Iraq, but not yet available.  
Furthering the Case: Expenditure During the War in Afghanistan 
 
At first glance, spending patterns in Afghanistan appear quite similar to those in 
Iraq. The war has followed similar spending patterns though delayed by the pace of 
 
110 Andrew J. Gawthorpe, “All Counterinsurgency is Local: Counterinsurgency and Rebel Legitimacy” 
Small Wars & Insurgencies 28 no. 4-5, (2017): 844, Doi: 10.1080/09592318.2017.1322330  
 
111 “Iraq Profile – Timeline,” (BBC: October 3, 2018). https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-
14546763. 
112 Liz Sly, “ISIS at a crossroads,” Washington Post (December 24, 2019).  
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operations relative to Iraq. In 2009, a troop surge announced by the Obama administration 
was predictably followed by a spike in spending. In 2011, the peak year of spending on 
combat operations, a “drawdown” was announced. The drawdown was deemed complete 
by 2014.113 During this period, spending began to decline and the downward trend 
continued until levelling off in 2016. The U.S. has spent more than the Afghani government 
by a magnitude of 100 or more on an annual basis.  
 
 
 Author compilation from: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and the Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program. Individual figures for U.S. expenditure in Afghanistan and Iraq from 
Amadeo, Kimberly. “Cost of the Iraq War, Its Timeline, and the Economic Impact.” The Balance 
(August 5, 2020). And; Crawford, Neta C. “Costs of War.” Watson Insititute: Brown University, 
2018. 
 
Of particular note in Figure 4.3 is not the spending, however, but that in 2014 deaths 
spiked significantly and have continued to tend upwards since. Although this would seem 
to confirm the idea that low spending tends to exacerbate insurgent violence, it is 
confounding in light of the Iraq chart of U.S. expenditure, where spending decreased along 
with deaths. With U.S. spending stripped away, however, a different pattern emerges. 
 
113 Barbara S. Torreon, “U.S. Periods of War and Dates of Recent Conflicts,” (Washington: Congressional 
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 Unlike Iraq, which made increasing and sustained military investments as the U.S. 
completed its surge and began to withdraw, Afghanistan’s spending decreased and levelled 
off. Predictably, as Afghani expenditure flattened out at lower levels, the death toll 
continued to trend higher. This again serves to further the case in favor of countries taking 
the lead on counterinsurgency efforts within their borders, investing heavily on the 
necessary operations and then sustaining their expenditure as Paul’s “Paths to Victory” 
describes.114  
 While spending in Iraq and Afghanistan looks similar when U.S. expenditures are 
accounted for, it is actually quite different when looking at each country individually. 
Comparing figures 4.1 and 4.4 makes this clear. Iraq’s pattern of spending while increasing 
and sustained at a high level is simply much greater than the spending seen in Afghanistan. 
 


















































































































This fact alone may indicate great state capacity in Iraq, more urgency in the 
counterinsurgency efforts, or more access to expensive military equipment. Any one of 
these factors could account for Iraq’s greater counterinsurgency successes in light of the 
country’s higher level of spending. Certainly, there are factors that differentiate Iraq and 
Afghanistan that are not accounted for when considering spending alone such as 
geography, local culture, and government, but examining spending illustrates significant 
divergence between the countries’ approaches to counterinsurgency. Taken together with 
cases examined in pervious chapters, however, the patterns here are remarkably consistent 
and provide an example of both the impact of high spending and low spending as they 
relate to conflict deaths during an insurgency.  
Algeria: A Final Test 
 
 Algeria is yet another country that has battled a well-known insurgent movement. 
The Algerian Civil War persisted for nearly the entirety of the 1990s, ending around 
1999115 with some violence continuing into the early 2000s. Much like Afghanistan, 
Algeria itself is no stranger to insurgent and counter insurgent tactics having waged a 




115 James MacDougall, A History of Algeria, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017): 322-323.   
doi:10.1017/9781139029230. 
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 The pattern depicted in Figure 4.5 should at this point look familiar, once again 
mirroring data from other countries that have suppressed internal conflict. While overall 
spending has increased significantly over the past decade, reflecting larger global trends, 
this pattern has also correlated with suppressed and decreasing numbers of deaths 
associated with remaining insurgents active in the region.  
 A Congressional Research Service report, updated in 2020, attributes Algeria’s 
relative stability since the 2000s to the country’s “frequent counter-terrorism operations 
and bolstered… presence in border regions.”117 This aligns with both counterinsurgency 
best practices and the Algerian government’s increased expenditure over this period. 
Algeria’s stability and low rate of insurgent violence has occurred even as insurgency and 
terrorism have become fixtures in North Africa. This could be considered a testament to 
 













































































































the country’s high level of security, which is likely linked to their increasing military 
spending which has risen from around 3 billion dollars in 2002 to around 10 billion dollars 
in each of the past three years.    
Conclusion 
 
 These cases, taken together, do suggest a pattern of correlation between a country’s 
military spending and suppressing internal violence. This was previously observed in the 
cases of Colombia and Sri Lanka and appears again when looking at Iraq, Afghanistan, and 
Algeria. The cases of Iraq and Afghanistan also reinforce the idea that top heavy spending 
by countries like the U.S. can serve to hide trends in military expenditure that may 
otherwise be visible. While this remains to be proven on a global scale the two cases 
presented here offer a micro view of this theory that may be investigated more thoroughly 
in a study with a larger scope.  
 The Iraq case, while instructive in this instance should also be evaluated with 
caution. The data included above ends with the official U.S. withdraw but a distinct phase 
in the conflict emerged in 2014 causing a spike in deaths and expenditure. This outlier data 
would heavily impact the analysis if included. It appears to be too early to determine how 
this situation may be resolved by the Iraqi government with the conflict still ongoing and 
sustaining a high death toll and high expenditure for the additional years in which data is 
available. If Iraqi investment climbs higher and conflict is eventually suppressed this could 
further the arguments made above. If the violence remains unchecked, however, the Iraq 
case may no longer prove a suitable example once data becomes available for 2019, 2020 
and beyond.  
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 Many factors that may influence a country’s military spending, conflict deaths, and 
counterinsurgency efforts are not examined here. While effective counterinsurgency is 
undoubtedly a lengthy and expensive proposition and countries that sustain high military 
budgets appear to have better counterinsurgency results, there are still many external 
factors at play. One crucial element that is not examined here is how money is being spent. 
Are countries training troops, dropping bombs, or financing expeditionary campaigns? 
While it can be assumed that countries like Iraq and Algeria, which have significantly 
reduced violence, are spending on appropriate interventions, this would need to be studied 
separately.  
Broadly speaking, it makes sense that spending by the local government would pay 
significantly higher dividends in the delicate world of counterinsurgency operations. Given 
the need to surgically cut off insurgents from their lines of support, an activity which 
requires significant knowledge of local terrain, both physical and cultural, along with the 
need to sustain operations over a long period, indigenous forces clearly have an advantage 
even with relatively modest budgets. It is surprising, however, that such high levels of U.S. 
spending in Iraq and Afghanistan appears to have had such little impact on the death tolls 
of these conflicts. Further analysis of exactly how funds are applied will help elucidate this 
apparent discrepancy.  
 Despite the broad analysis offered above, the ability to separate military 
expenditure here by both country and year is enabled by high quality, publicly available 
datasets that are accessible and useful thanks to modern technology. Data for military 
expenditure for the Algerian War from 1954 to 1962, for example, is not available in this 
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dataset, though it would be useful for this analysis.118 Similarly, some expenditure data and 
all conflict death data are based on estimates. This type of data is improving over time, 
however, making studies like this one increasingly viable in the future. This relates to 
Blattman’s idea of “micro datasets” which, one hopes, will increasingly allow scholars to 
refine the study of complex topics like war. These micro datasets should enable further 
breakdowns of economic data, including military expenditure, to allow for more nuanced 
analysis of spending in conflict which may better demonstrate how conflict is impacted by 
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 The most general finding that applies across all three chapters of this study is that 
high levels of global military expenditure do not appear linked to high levels of conflict 
deaths over the past 30 years. Whether looking at a specific procurement program like 
Foreign Military Sales; the military budgets of individual countries; or a specific conflict 
type, such as insurgency, most of the cases examined here suggest that high military 
spending has suppressed conflict deaths to some extent, at least since 1988. This study does 
not eliminate the possibility that higher military budgets may be associated with higher 
conflict deaths when controlling for additional variables or examining a longer time 
horizon.  
The finding of slight negative correlation between military spending and conflict 
deaths must be caveated given that this study could not control for the numerous 
intervening variables and the existence of certain exceptions, such as countries like 
Ethiopia with low military budgets. The use of charts to highlight trends between military 
spending and conflict deaths did allow for the identification these exceptions and for the 
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qualitative analysis of broad macro data. A regression analysis is the logical next step as it 
would allow for the control of intervening variables and could more thoroughly examine 
global trends on a country-by-country basis. Having observed the divergence between 
increasing military spending and decreasing conflict deaths across the diverse cases 
examined here, it seems likely that the pattern observed in this study will hold up to 
stronger statistical scrutiny.  
 Among the cases examined, the most notable relationship between military 
expenditure and conflict deaths is observed in countries fighting insurgents as discussed in 
chapters two and three. Although correlations were often weak, the cases of insurgency 
presented in chapter three did show reliably negative correlations between military 
expenditure and conflict deaths across the board. The only exception was with Afghanistan 
where expenditure levelled off and deaths predictably rose. This only serves to strengthen 
the conclusion that high military spending may be particularly significant to 
counterinsurgency operations.  
 Examining U.S. spending in Afghanistan and Iraq also highlights the importance 
of observing military spending patterns without the U.S.’s top-heavy influence. 
Particularly in the case of Iraq, viewing the data without U.S. spending told a very different 
story. Given the high levels of U.S. spending globally, as well as the U.S.’s influence on 
numerous conflicts through programs such as Foreign Military Sales and Direct 
Commercial Sales, similar effects may be occurring in many countries. The global military 
data itself may also be distorted because of the outsized spending of superpowers like the 
U.S. and China. Although it would be almost impossible to completely control for the 
influence these heavyweights may have on other countries’ military budgets, acquisitions, 
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and conflicts, research on the spending patterns of lower spending countries seems likely 
to uncover trends that cut against assumptions of  the impact of military spending and 
reveal both benefits and detriments inherent in low spending regimes.   
 The U.S. Foreign Military Sales program was the most specific policy mechanism 
examined. Fitting with the broader findings of this study, deliveries of military aid rarely 
precede increases in deaths. Depending on how one interprets the data provided in chapter 
two, Foreign Military Sales deliveries could either be viewed as providing a deterrent that 
helps end conflict or generally arriving too late to be a significant factor in most of the 
cases examined. The several cases presented here suggest the possibility that high numbers 
of conflict deaths in a country or region may encourage increased utilization of Foreign 
Military Sales. Having primarily examined years in which countries received military aid 
rather than when they signed agreements, this study is not well positioned to assess this 
theory. Anecdotal evidence suggests this does occur, at least occasionally, as in the case of 
Georgia, which had high engagement with the Foreign Military Sales program during the 
Chechen War.  
It can be argued whether the Foreign Military Sales program is living up to its stated 
goal of “[promoting] world peace”119 but the cases examined in this study suggest it is a 
safe policy tool in the short-term given the tendency of deliveries to precede reductions in 
conflict deaths or occur after a conflict has already begun to wane. Consideration should 
be given, however, to the longer-term impacts of such sales. Although the U.S. may aim to 
control the future use of weapons sold through such programs, there is undoubtedly a loss 
of accountability inherent to providing weapons to foreign countries. This study did not 
 
119 Defense Security Cooperation Agency (2020).  
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address long-term Foreign Military Sales impact or attempt to track the movement of 
weapons after delivery. These weapons may end up sold to other countries, lost in battle, 
or otherwise appropriated for a variety of uses, potentially at the expense of human rights. 
As a result, policy regarding such programs should be viewed cautiously and should take 
the long-term outlook of such sales into account. More detailed studies of Foreign Military 
Sales could work to trace individual shipments over a longer time horizon, potentially even 
the entire service life of a procurement, to determine the impacts this program has in the 
years beyond the initial deliveries.  
 Analyzing countries’ military budgets raises similar concerns. This study observes 
a general trend in increasing military budgets over the past 30 years but could not trace 
how these increases are being spent or how that may influence the relationship between 
such spending and conflict deaths. While it is assumed here that increased budgets lead to 
increased military capability, it could just as easily be assumed that increased capability, 
whether through training, procurement of technology, or increasing force size would 
require higher overall costs to maintain. Therefore, small increases in capability could have 
bigger long-term impacts on military budgets that may increase over time as maintenance 
costs increase either due to the age of assets or inflation. This would make high military 
budgets an unlikely driver of conflict deaths as high costs would largely be tied to static 
capabilities. Although granular budget data may not be available for all countries examined 
here, further studies examining how countries’ military budgets are structured as well as 
countries’ spending in a variety of security environments would help eliminate much 
uncertainty regarding the outcomes of military spending.  
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 Situating these cases within the global economic picture is also important. 
Considering global military spending in terms of real dollars spent compared to spending 
as a percentage of GDP tells two different stories. This study focused on real spending 
based on constant dollars, which has increased since 1988. As a percent of GDP, military 
spending has dropped from a high of 3.5 percent in 1988 to just below 2.5 percent in 1995, 
a number that has stayed relatively consistent since.  
120 
This suggest that globally, countries may spend more on their militaries as their budgets 
grow while keeping overall expenditure pegged at constant levels. Expanding this data, 
however, would show that spending, as a percent of GDP was higher during the Cold War 
and higher still during World War II. This suggests that countries’ military spending 
relative to their total economic output is what truly reflects their political reality. Although 
World War II would be an outlier in death data relative to what is explored in this study, it 
is likely not a coincidence that the conflict and its high death toll aligns with high spending 
 
120 Data from: “Military Expenditure (% of GDP), 1960 to 2017,” and “Military Expenditure, Constant 








































































































as a percent of GDP.121 It is also not likely coincidental that global military spending 
dropped noticeably in 1991 as the Soviet Union dissolved in December of that year.    
 It is worth noting that NATO allied nations are encouraged to “commit a minimum of 
two per cent of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to spending on defence [sic].”122 This 
suggests that two percent of GDP is considered at least a minimally optimal defense 
expenditure and that countries should expect to increase their spending in terms of real 
dollars as their GDP increases. This also suggests that maintaining overall spending of two 
percent of GDP within NATO member countries is considered a desirable target even if 
U.S. spending were to decrease. Although it is far from this study to determine or 
recommend an optimal target for military spending, this two percent figure does emerge as 
a reasonably achievable floor that appears likely to maintain the current status quo in terms 
of global stability with an annual conflict death rate at or around 100,000 people per year.  
 It may come as no surprise that the burden of conflict deaths over the past 30 years 
has fallen hardest on the poorest countries, particularly in Africa. This has of course 
coincided with spikes in military spending, as described in chapter three. Rwanda spent 
nearly six percent of GDP during the Rwandan Civil War and Ethiopia spent around 10 
percent of GDP in both 1989 and 1999.123 Interestingly, both countries now spend below 
even the average for other low-income countries. Although this could benefit these 
countries by freeing up funds for important human development projects, in light previous 
findings this low spending may also create a dangerous security vacuum that either will 
 
121 Exact figures are not available but averaging military expenditure as a share of GDP data from Our 
World in Data suggests military expenditure in 1945 was approximately 46% of global GDP. Averaging 
deaths from the same source suggests a global death toll of about 3.5 million in that year.  
122 “Funding NATO,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, (May 5, 2020). 
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67655.htm. 
123 See note 117.  
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need to be filled by concerned allies at their own expense, or could lead to further conflict 
and instability due to chronic underfunding of these countries’ military needs. Future 
studies should address what could be either the inability or unwillingness of the poorest 
countries to fund their militaries. While it may not be the most pressing concern for some 
of these countries, leaving the poorest countries poorly defended seems to put them at a 
comparative disadvantage in a world where countries are averaging two percent 
expenditure of their rising GDP on defense and security.  
 The discussion of conflict in places like Africa or the Middle East also raises 
numerous issues of intervening variables not accounted for in this study. While there was 
significant correlation between military spending and conflict death in Ethiopia, for 
example, this may not be causative or may reflect reverse causation. It is possible the 
impetus for conflict in this or any other conflict could be rooted in factors that may also 
influence a country’s ability or willingness to spend on their military. Income inequality 
may be exacerbated by an economic variable such as poor trade policy, leading to conflict 
while simultaneously reducing a country’s ability to invest in its military. As a result, a 
country may reduce its military expenditure and simultaneously find itself dealing with a 
conflict though neither outcome caused the other. Similar scenarios could play out with a 
variety of impacts caused by all manner of additional variables. These types of complex 
relationships could not be captured in this study but future examinations of economic 
drivers of conflict could control for variables such as local economic conditions, 
availability and types of arms, and political systems to paint a more complete picture for 
specific countries.  
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 Finally, the opportunity costs of the expenditures must be addressed. As discussed 
at the outset and by scholars such as Askari,124 the large pool of funding set aside for 
military expenditure could be applied to human needs where it may have greater and more 
immediate impact. Food and energy security, healthcare, and education all stand out as 
areas where additional funding could be immediately beneficial for many people around 
the world. While Askari’s work seems to imply that reducing conflict would be likely to 
free up the funds currently devoted to it, the conclusions of this study suggest this may not 
be the case. Given that the current regime of high military spending has persisted during a 
period of relative global peace and stability with low and mostly stable rates of conflict 
deaths, it is possible that the current military spending paradigm is providing a net benefit. 
Particularly considering militaries’ ever decreasing share of global GDP, it is hard to view 
military spending as a major detractor for spending on other programs and even harder to 
recommend a significant reduction in this spending.  
 It should be taken as a given that some level of military spending is inevitable. At 
the very least, among hegemonic powers, the armament of one begets the armament of 
others and there is no plausible scenario or precedent for global demilitarization in the 
current geopolitical context. As a result, even the prospect of reallocating some defense 
spending to other endeavors would fall short of the total GDP currently allocated to 
militaries. This makes the prospect of reallocating these funds somewhat less desirable 
simply because, even in the most optimistic scenarios, any additional money would fall 
below the two percent global average. Countries with higher military budgets may be able 
 
124 Hossein Askari, Conflicts and Wars, (2012). 
84 
 
to squeeze out slightly more and countries spending less would get less. This still fails to 
account for the risks.  
 Any major reduction to military spending, especially on a global scale, has the 
potential to alter the security environment. While this could tip the balance in favor of 
peace, it could also push countries towards greater conflict. At the cost of two percent of 
GDP, this is likely a risk few policy makers would willingly take and the evidence in this 
study does not make it clear that doing so would have any benefit. A reduction of military 
expenditure to a global total of 0.5 percent, an undoubtedly lofty goal, would return about 
1.5 trillion dollars to state treasuries. While substantial, given that the greatest share of this 
money would go to the world’s largest economies, the impacts would likely be felt only 
minimally. In the worst-case scenario, however, in which the resulting shake up of global 
military power causes a conflict on the scale of World War II, this could come at the 
expense of millions of lives. Critics can rightly argue that such conflicts would not be 
possible without high levels of military spending but there seems to be no better motivator 
for increased spending than the outbreak of war and current spending practices appear to 
have made those instances relatively small and isolated.  
 Once again, due consideration should be given to countries which do not factor 
heavily on these global debates over military spending. The countries hit hardest by conflict 
deaths over the past 30 years, such as Rwanda and Ethiopia, and more recently Yemen and 
Syria, find themselves in a unique position. With weak economies and fluctuating military 
budgets, these countries remain poorly positioned to prevent conflict and are likely to be 
heavily burdened both financially and in terms of human life if one should erupt. This 
represents perhaps the greatest opportunity for the application of the current paradigm of 
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military expenditure. While reducing spending may be too risky, and idling such expensive 
armies may be criticized as wasteful, militaries could be used to help stabilize and protect 
at-risk regions thereby providing benefits for non-military development while maintaining 
deterrent forces and minimizing waste.  
While such proposals are fraught with political, legal, and even ethical challenges, 
they are not without precedent. One need only look to the post-World War II defense 
regimes in Germany or Japan to see the positive outcomes of defense arrangements that 
kept conflict deaths low as both countries grew their economies dramatically.125 While 
these cases are not perfect analogies for how security assistance could be applied in strained 
regions around the world today, finding innovative ways to gain increased benefits from 
current military expenditures is likely to help placate critics of high spending regimes and 
help proponents maximize the efficiency and benefits of their defense dollars. Satisfying 




125 James Dobbins et al., “Post–World War II Nation-Building: Germany and Japan,”" In After the War: 
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